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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
i\jo. 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
This appea I i s from . i |ui • v^rdir! i i iii] IIKIJ lii^  Defendant 
guilty of one count of first degree murder, a felony of the first 
degree in violation of U.C.A. § 76-5-203 (1953, as amended); the 
Defendant s sentence was enhanced i inder U C i § 76-3-203 (] 953 as 
amended) .  The Defendant was found guilty of the above charges, 
after a joint jury trial before the Honorable Ben Hadfield, Judge 
of the F11: st: J i idic:i a ] DIst:ri ct, :: i i t: 1 l e II II t: 1 I ::ia> of Api i ] , ] 9 95 . ' 
Jurisdiction to hear this case is conferred upon the Supreme 
Court of the State of Utah pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-2-2 (3) (i) (1953, 
as amended) and R uJ e 2 6 of t:i le 1 Jtal I R i il e s :: f Ci: :i mi na] Procedure . 
The Supreme Court exercised its authority and poured the case over 
to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
STATE OF UTAH, * 
• t-
Plaintiff/Appellee, * 
* 
i • 
BRANDON A. DAHLQUIST, ' 
• • 
Defendant/Appellant. * 
1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court's failure to suppress the Defendant's 
coerced statement to police, violate the Defendant's Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendment rights to counsel and due process? 
Standard of Review Trial court decisions to deny motions to 
suppress evidence are reviewed under the clearly erroneous 
standard. State v. Brown, 853 P. 2d 851, 854 (Utah 1992) . The 
Court of Appeals reviews the trial court's conclusions for 
correctness. Erickson v. Schenkers Int'l Forwarders, Inc., 882 
P.2d 1147, 1148 (Utah 1994); State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 
1994) . 
2. Did the trial court's failure to sever the joint trials 
of the co-defendants, violate the Defendant's Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights to confrontation? 
Standard of Review Constitutional issues are a question of 
law. The trial court's determination of questions of law are given 
no deference and are reviewed by this Court for correctness. State 
v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1271 (Utah 1993) . The Appellate courts 
do not reverse a denial of severance as a matter of right, a denial 
to sever co-defendants will be reversed only if a defendant's 
rights to a fair trial were impaired. Utah v. O'Brien, 721 P.2d 
896 (1986) . 
When the error amounts to a violation of a Defendant's right 
of confrontation reversal is required unless the error is harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Villarreal, 889 P.2d 419 (Utah 
1995) . 
2 
3 Did the trial court's failure to sever the joint trials 
of i-'- defendants, violate II.;1 A § 77-8a-l (1953, as amended) 
thus, violating the Defendant's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment 
rights to confrontation and due process? 
Standard of Review Const:i tin itiona,3 issues are • ;uebiion of 
law. The trial court's determination of questions of law are given 
no deference and are reviewed by this Court for correctness. State 
v. Thurman, *. ) * ^ ourts 
do not reverse a denial of severance as a matter of right, a denial 
to sever co-defendants will be reversed only if a defendant's 
rights to a fai t: t::i j al wei: e i mpaired Utah v. O'Brien, 72III P , 2d 
896 (1986) . 
court's failure to follow established 
federa - . *::,-:• •;..•;:.;.. -ver ::. -
defendant joint trials, violate the Defendant's Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendment rights to confrontation and due process? 
Standard of Review mstitutioiiai i&out-{j ..n^  „i iiu^ ut ion uf: 
law. The trial court's determination of questions of law are given 
no deference and are reviewed r- this Court for correctness. State 
v. Thurman, 846 P 2d 1256 , tali 1 993 ) The ; Appel late ::oi irts 
do not reverse a denial of severance as a matter of right, a denial 
to sever co-defendants will be reversed only if lefendant's 
rights to a fad r trial were impaired Utah v. O'Brien, 72] E 2d 
896 (1986). 
5. D:i d the tri a ] court's admission of the non testifying co-
defendant's confessions, under the hearsay exception L_.. ;„ 
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Utah R. Evid., violate the Defendant's Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights to confrontation and due process? 
Standard of Review Constitutional issues are a question of 
law. The trial court's determination of questions of law are given 
no deference and are reviewed by this Court for correctness. State 
v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1271 (Utah 1993). 
When the error amounts to a violation of a Defendant's right 
of confrontation reversal is required unless the error is harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Villarreal, 889 P. 2d 419 (Utah 
1995) . 
6. Did closing arguments of counsel for the co-defendant 
violate the Defendant's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment Rights to 
confrontation and due process? 
Standard of Review Closing arguments of the prosecution were 
reviewed and found that an otherwise valid conviction should not be 
set aside if the reviewing court may confidently say, on the whole 
record, that the constitutional error was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Utah v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546 (1987). 
7. Did the trial court abused its discretion when it 
sentenced the Defendant to a term of one year to a maximum of five 
years, to run consecutive for his conviction under U.C.A. § 76-3-
203(1) (1953, as amended)? 
Standard of Review Reviewing courts should grant substantial 
deference to the broad authority given legislatures to determine 
the types of punishments for crimes and to the broad discretion 
granted trial courts for sentencing convicted criminals. State v. 
4 
Robinson, 797 P. 2d 431 (Utah App. 1990) A sentence will not be 
overturned on appeal unless the trial court abused it's discretion, 
failed to consider all legal 1 y r el e v ant factor s or imposed a 
sentence that exceeds legally prescribed limits. State v. Nuttall, 
861 P.2d 454 (Utah App. 1993); State v. Gibbons, 779 P.2d 113 (Utah 
1989) . 
CITATION' TO THE RECORD PRESERVING ISSUES FOR APPEAL 
Issue 1. The Defendant's trial attorney properly made twc> 
separate pre-trial motions to suppress the Defendant's coerced 
statement: to till e poli ce - ' J<± dL I-OO; March 28, ;95 
at 66-76) . 
Issue 2. The Defendant's trial attorney properly made a 
moti i sever the trials • • co-defendant:' s di le to 
irreconcilable, conflicting and antagonistic defenses (R Sept 
19, '94 at 3). 
The Defendant s t:i::i a ] attorney proper] j made a secon d moti on 
to sever the trials of the co-defendants. (R . March 28, '95 at 66-
76) . 
The Defendant s tri a] at ton ie;y proper ] y made a til: li rd mot: oi i to 
sever the trials of the co-defendants. (R. Trial at 2, 13 8) 
The Defendant's trial attorney made a motion for interlocutory 
appeal regarding se v e i: ance (R Tr i a ] e .t 2 6 4) 
The Defendant's trial attorney properly made a motion for 
mistrial due to the prosecution's file container that displayed in 
5 
large block letters on two sides of the box reading "Telequist." 
(R. Trial at 136-38). 
The Defendant's trial attorney properly made a second motion 
for mistrial due to the prosecution's file container that displayed 
the name "Telequist.11 (R. Trial at 404). 
Issue 3. The Defendant's trial attorney properly made a 
motion to suppress the statements of the non testifying co-
defendant in combination with a motion to sever, as a violation of 
the Defendant's right to confrontation. (R. Sept. 19, '94 at 18). 
The Defendant's trial attorney properly made a motion to 
suppress the redacted statements of the co-defendant. (R. March 
28, '95 at 59) . 
The Defendant's trial attorney properly made an objection to 
the admittance of the non testifying co-defendant's redacted 
statements. (R. Trial at 766-68). 
Issue 4. The Defendant's trial attorney made a proper renewed 
motion for mistrial and severance. (R. Trial at 1028) . 
Issue 5. The Defendant's trial attorney made a proper 
objection to the closing arguments of co-defendant's counsel. (R. 
Trial at 1629, 1648-57). 
Issue 7. The Defendant's trial attorney made a proper motion 
for mistrial with jeopardy attached due to invited error because of 
improper joinder of the co-defendants. (R. Trial at 1648). 
6 
U.S. CONSTITUTION, AMEND. V: 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital; or 
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or 
indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in 
the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when actual 
service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any 
person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in 
jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be 
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for 
public use, without just compensation. 
U.S. CONSTITUTION, AMEND. VI; 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an 
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed, which district shall 
have been previously ascertained by law, and to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, 
and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence. 
U.S. CONSTITUTION, AMEND. XIV, SECTION 1; 
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized m the 
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, 
are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any 
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
UTAH CONSTITUTION ART. 1, SECTION 7; 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law. 
UTAH CONSTITUTION ART 1, SECTION 12; 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the 
right to appear and defend in person and by counsel, to 
demand the nature and cause of the accusation against 
him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance 
of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public 
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in 
which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and 
the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall 
any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled 
to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein 
guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to give 
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evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled 
to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his 
wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for 
the same offense. (Emphasis added). 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a 
preliminary examination, the function of that examination 
is limited to determining whether probable cause exists 
unless otherwise provided by statute. Nothing in this 
constitution shall preclude the use of reliable hearsay 
evidence as defined by statute or rule in whole or in 
part at any preliminary examination to determine probable 
cause or at any pretrial proceeding with respect to 
release of the defendant if appropriate discovery is 
allowed as defined by statute or rule. 
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 
Rule 804, Hearsay exceptions; declarant unavailable. 
(b) Hearsay exceptions. The following are not 
excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is 
unavailable as a witness. 
(3) Statement against interest. A statement which was 
at the time of its making so far contrary to the 
declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far 
tended to subject the declarant to civil or criminal 
liability, or to render invalid a claim by the declarant 
against another, that a reasonable person in the 
declarant's position would not have made the statement 
unless believing it to be true. A statement tending to 
expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered to 
exculpate the accused is not admissible unless 
corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the 
trustworthiness of the statement. 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
U.C.A. § 77-8a-l. Joinder of offenses and of defendants. 
(2) (b) Two or more defendants may be charged in the 
same indictment or information if they are alleged to 
have participated in the same act or conduct or in the 
same criminal episode. 
(d) When two or more defendants are jointly charged with 
any offense, they shall be tried jointly unless the court 
in its discretion on motion or otherwise orders separate 
trials consistent with the interest of justice. 
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(4) (a) If the court finds a defendant or the 
prosecution is prejudiced by a joinder of offenses or 
defendants in an indictment or information or by a 
joinder for trial together, the court shall order an 
election of separate trials of separate counts, grant a 
severance of defendants, or provide other relief as 
justice requires. 
(b) A defendants' right to severance of offenses or 
defendants is waived if the motion is not made at least 
five days before trial. In ruling on a motion by 
defendant for severance, the court may order the 
prosecutor to disclose any statements made by the 
defendants which he intends to introduce in evidence at 
the trial. 
U.C.A. § 76-5-203, Murder. 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes murder if the actor: 
(a) intentionally or knowingly causes the 
death of another; 
(b) intending to cause serious bodily injury 
to another commits an act clearly dangerous to 
human life that causes the death of another; 
(c) acting under circumstances evidencing a 
depraved indifference to human life engages in 
conduct which creates a grave risk of death to 
another and thereby causes the death of 
another; 
(2) Murder is a first degree felony. 
U.C.A. § 76-3-203(1) Enhanced penalty for use of a firearm. 
A person who has been convicted of a felony may be 
sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as 
follows: 
(1) In the case of a felony of the first degree, 
for a term of not less than five years, unless otherwise 
specifically provided by law, and which may be for life 
but if the trier of fact finds a firearm or a facsimile 
or the representation of a firearm was used in the 
commission or furtherance of the felony, the court shall 
additionally sentence the person convicted for a term of 
one year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and 
the court may additionally sentence the person convicted 
for an indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run 
consecutively and not concurrently. 
9 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS WITH CITATIONS TO THE RECORD 
Troy Weston was murdered at the south end of Willard Bay in 
Box Elder County on March 12, 1994. (R. Trial 283, 285). The 
discovery of the body was initially reported to the Weber County 
Sheriff's Office. (R. Trial 289, 300). It was later learned that 
the body was actually discovered in Box Elder County. The 
investigation was then turned over to the Box Elder Sheriff's 
Department. (R. Trial 307). 
The Defendant, Brandon A. Dahlquist, was arrested on March 14, 
1994 on a bench warrant for forgery. (R. Sept. 19, '94 at 50; March 
28, '95 at 74). Mr. Dahlquist was taken into custody and 
questioned regarding the murder of Troy Weston by detectives from 
the Box Elder Sheriff's Office. (R. Sept. 19, '94 at 41; R. Trial 
at 738) . At the outset of the questioning regarding the murder, 
even before a complete Miranda warning was read to Mr. Dahlquist, 
he unequivocally invoked his right to counsel. (See transcript of 
interview, Addendum A) . Detective Dale Ward from the Box Elder 
County Sheriff's Office refused to acknowledge Mr. Dahlquist's 
request for counsel, and employed techniques that Detective Ward 
later admitted amounted to an interrogation of the Defendant. (R. 
Sept. 19, '94 at 46-48). During the reading of the Miranda 
warning, Mr. Dahlquist requested counsel at least five times. 
(Addendum A). When Detective Ward finished reading Mr. Dahlquist 
the Miranda warning, he confronted Mr. Dahlquist with a series of 
lies which implicated Mr. Dahlquist in the murder of Troy Weston. 
(R. March 28, '95 at 72). When Mr. Dahlquist attempted to respond 
10 
to Detective Ward's allegation, he made a statement that could be 
construed as incriminating. 
Mr. Dahlquist's trial counsel made two separate pre-trial 
motions to suppress the improperly obtained statement. (R. Sept 19, 
'94 at 1-58; March 28, '95 at 66-76). The only witness who 
testified at the first hearing was Detective Ward. Mr. Ward 
testified entirely from a transcript of the Defendant's interview. 
R. Sept. 19, '94 at 1-58). After the hearing, Judge Ben Hadfield 
denied the motion to suppress Mr. Dahlquist's statement. Several 
weeks after the Defendant's first motion was denied, Mr. 
Dahlquist's trial counsel obtained a copy of an audio recording of 
Mr. Dahlquist's interrogation. Based upon additional information 
found on the audio tape, a second Motion to Suppress was made 
before the trial court. (R. March 28, '95 at 66-76). Despite 
Detective Ward admitting that he had subconsciously used 
interrogation techniques after Mr. Dahlquist invoked his right to 
counsel, (R. Sept. 19, '94 at 47,48), the trial court denied 
Defendant's second Motion to Suppress. The Defendant's statement 
was later admitted as a crucial piece of evidence against the 
Defendant during his trial. (R. Trial 738). 
On March 31, 1994, warrants were issued for the arrests of Mr. 
Dahlquist and the co-defendant, Travis Telford, for the murder of 
Troy Weston. 
A preliminary hearing was held on May 25, 1995. After two 
witnesses testified for the State, the Defendants waived their 
11 
right to the remainder of the preliminary hearing, and both 
defendants were bound over to the District Court. 
Prior to and during Mr. Telford's incarceration, he made 
several conflicting statements which implicated Mr. Dahlquist and 
exculpated Mr. Telford. (R. June 15, '94 at 9, 10; Sept. 19, '94 at 
20) . 
Based upon the fact that the State's evidence against the 
Defendants was purely circumstantial, the county attorney chose to 
try the Defendants jointly in an attempt to get otherwise 
inadmissible evidence before the jury. (R. March 28, '95 at 25). 
This allowed the State to bolster their case against Mr. Dahlquist 
in that Mr. Telford's statements could be used against Mr. 
Dahlquist. Mr. Dahlquist's trial counsel filed a motion to sever 
the trial on August 31, 1994. The trial court denied the motion, 
but ordered that any statements by the co-defendant, Mr. Telford, 
could only be used against Mr. Telford, (R. Sept. 19, '94 at 24) . 
Later the Court ordered that the statements be redacted to exclude 
any reference to Mr. Dahlquist's name or existence. (R. March 28, 
'95 at 59). 
After reviewing the redacted statements, counsel for both 
defendants made a joint request for severance of the defendants' 
trials. (R. Trial at 2, 138) . Judge Hadfield scheduled the hearing 
on the Defendants' joint motion, the first day of the defendants' 
joint trial. The hearing was held prior to opening statements, but 
after the jury had been selected, empaneled and sworn. (R. Trial at 
138) . This put the trial court in an awkward position, because if 
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the court had found that there were grounds to sever the trials, 
jeopardy had attached against both defendants, and as such the one 
defendant could not have been re-tried separately. 
The Defendant and co-defendant were tried jointly before a 
jury from April 3-11, 1995. During the trial, Mr. Telford invoked 
his Fifth amendment right against self incrimination, and did not 
testify in his own behalf. The prosecutor moved, over the 
objection of defense counsel, and had admitted, Mr. Telford's 
redacted statements. (R. Trial at 767, 768) . Although the 
statements had been redacted, they made reference to another 
person(s) . (R. Trial at 767, 768) . The use of the redacted 
statements forced Mr. Dahlquist into a position where he had to 
testify in an effort to explain Mr. Telford's redacted statements. 
Mr. Telford's counsel did not cross examine Mr. Dahlquist, and in 
fact, hardly participated in any cross-examination through out the 
entire trial. (R. Trial at 1555, 1623). 
During closing arguments, Mr. Telford's counsel, Mr. Bouwhuis, 
made numerous references to Mr. Dahlquist and stated that he 
thought that Mr. Dahlquist was the triggerman in this case. 
(R.Trial at 1625, 1629, 1634, 1636, 1641, 1642). There was no 
evidence submitted during the trial to support this contention by 
Mr. Telford's attorney. The reference of such evidence was made 
solely from the redacted portions of the statements made by Mr. 
Telford. In addition, Mr. Telford's counsel in closing made 
inferences that Mr. Telford was fearful of being placed in Weber 
County Jail because of Mr. Dahlquist's presence. (R. Trial at 
13 
1634) . Evidence of this issue was never submitted during the trial 
and was done only in an attempt to shift the blame on to Mr. 
Dahlquist. All of this was done over the objection of defense 
counsel. (R. Trial at 1648-1657). 
The jury found the defendant guilty of one count of first 
degree murder with a firearm enhancement. The Defendant was 
sentenced to a term of five years to life in the Utah State Prison 
for the conviction of first degree murder, and an indeterminate 
term of not less than one and no more than five years for the 
firearm enhancement, to run consecutive to the first degree murder 
conviction. (T. May 30, ' 95 at 16, 18). 
The Defendant now appeals from his conviction. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The trial court erred by admitting the Defendant's 
statement which was gained through a violation of his Fifth 
Amendment right to counsel before conducting a custodial 
interrogation. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); State v. 
Hilfiker, 868 P.2d 826 (Utah 1994). 
2. The Defendant's right to a fair trial was violated when 
the trial court refused to sever the Defendant's trial as required 
under U.C.A. § 77-8a-l (2) (d) (1953) . Section 78-8a-l mandates that 
a trial court shall grant a severance of defendants' trials. The 
Defendant could not overcome the prejudice that resulted form the 
trial court's failure to sever the trial. 
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3. The Defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confront and 
cross examine witnesses against him was violated by the admission 
of the non testifying co-defendant's conflicting statements and 
confessions. During a joint trial a defendant is exposed to a 
unique situation when a co-defendant refuses to testify, and the 
State is allowed to admit the co-defendant's statements at trial. 
The Defendant was forced to defend against the co-defendant's 
"confession" without the benefit of cross examination. When the 
trial court allowed the co-defendant's statement into evidence, it 
violated the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, and 
unduly prejudiced the Defendant. Bruton v. U.S., 391 U.S. 123, 88 
S.Ct. 1620 (1968); Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530 (1986). 
4. The Defendant's right to confrontation under the Sixth 
Amendment, was violated by the trial court's refusal to follow well 
established Utah case law when it denied the Defendant's numerous 
motions to sever. When considering a motion to sever, the trial 
court must weigh possible prejudice with judicial economy, with any 
doubts concerning prejudice being decided in favor of the 
defendant. Utah v. O'Brien, 721 P.2d 896 (1986), State v. Collins, 
612 P.2d 775 (1980). Under O'Brien, a trial court must sever co-
defendants 's trials, if their defenses are antagonistic, 
irreconcilable, and inconsistent. 
5. The trial court violated the Defendant's Sixth Amendment 
Right to confront and cross examine witnesses against him, when the 
court allowed the co-defendant's confessions in to evidence under 
an exception to the Hearsay Rule. It was reversible error to allow 
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two of the co-defendant's "confessions" into evidence against the 
Defendant. The State argued that the "confessions" were admissible 
as an exception to the Hearsay Rule because they were statements 
against interest. For the statements to be admitted, the court had 
to find the statements either were firmly rooted in a hearsay 
exception or meet the two prong test set out in Ohio v. Roberts, 
448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
6. The Defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation 
and his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process was violated by 
the closing arguments of the co-defendant's counsel. The counsel's 
closing arguments referred to evidence not admitted. Further, the 
counsel's closing completely destroyed the Defendant's right to 
confrontation by bringing in evidence the trial court had ordered 
redacted from the non testifying co-defendant's confession. If a 
trial court refuses to sever co-defendants' trials, then the trial 
court must restrict a defense counsel's latitude and freedom of 
their closing argument against the co-defendant's right to due 
process. In the present case the Defendant's rights were trampled 
by the co-defendant's counsel's closing argument. 
7. The trial court erred when it enhanced the appellant's 
sentence on count I, First Degree Murder, under § 76-3-2 03 U.C.A. 
It is clear from the trial court's sentence that the appellant was 
sentenced to an indeterminate term of one to five years for his use 
of a firearm. Under § 76-3-203 U.C.A., the trial court's only 
discretion lies in sentencing the defendant for an indeterminate 
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term of not more than five years, or for a determinate term of not 
more than one year. State v. Willett. 694 P.2d 601 (Utah 1984). 
ARGUMENTS 
ARGUMENT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ADMITTING THE 
DEFENDANT'S STATEMENT GAINED THROUGH VIOLATION 
OF THE HIS FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL. 
A. FEDERAL LAW 
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides 
that "no person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be 
a witness against himself." The Supreme Court determined in 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), "that [t]his privilege is 
best protected by informing individuals of certain rights before 
conducting a custodial interrogation." State v. Hilfiker, 868 P.2d 
826 (Utah 1994). One such right is the "right to the presence of 
an attorney, either retained or appointed." Miranda at 444. Once 
a person indicates that he wishes to speak to an attorney, any and 
all questioning must cease. Id. at 444-45. To insure these rights 
upon arrest a person is read his Miranda rights, asked if he 
understands the rights, and is asked if he voluntarily waives the 
rights that were explained to him. 
These safeguards have resulted in the well established case 
law which insure: A confession elicited after a Defendant has 
invoked his Miranda rights violates the Fifth amendment. Edwards 
v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 485 (1981). Once a Defendant invokes his 
right to counsel the police must cease interrogation. Minnick v. 
Mississippi, 111 S.Ct. 486 (1990) . In addition, after the right to 
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counsel has been invoked, a Defendant may not be questioned 
regarding a separate investigation. Arizona v. Robersonf 486 U.S. 
675 (1990). 
B. UTAH CASE LAW 
Utah case law guarantees that statements taken in violation of 
the Miranda safeguards are excluded as evidence by the prosecution. 
Once a clear invocation of counsel is made by a person, " [t]he 
singular event which may occur upon a defendant's request . . . is 
for the defendant to consult with counsel." Utah v. Sampson, 808 
P.2d 1100 (Utah 1991). 
Utah has carved out an exception which allows statements to be 
used by the prosecution. However, the exception must meet a three 
prong test to determine if Miranda violations occurred. The three 
prong test first looks at whether the accused instead of the law 
enforcement officers initiated conversations in which incriminating 
statements were made. Second, the prosecution must show that the 
accused knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel. 
Third, The prosecution must show, by a preponderance of evidence, 
that the statements were voluntairily made. State v. Streeter, 900 
P.2d 1097, (Utah 1995), State v. Hilfiker, 868 P.2d 826 (Utah 
1994) . 
C. DAHLQUIST'S ARGUMENT 
In the present case, Dahlquist was arrested in Weber County 
and questioned by Box Elder Sheriff's deputies at the Box Elder 
County Sheriff's Office. Dahlquist invoked his right to counsel 
before his Miranda warnings were read. Dahlquist was aware he was 
18 
under investigation for outstanding forgery charges in Weber 
County. For the forgery charges Dahlquist was appointed an 
attorney through Weber County Public Defenders Association. 
Dahlquist was unaware of any other charges but determined he wanted 
an attorney before any questioning occurred. However, the deputy 
did not cease the interrogation. 
The deputy read Dahlquist his Miranda rights, Dahlquist once 
again, expressly invoked his right to have an attorney present. 
The deputy did not cease the interrogation as required under Utah 
v. Sampson, 808 P.2d 1100 (Utah 1991). 
After Dahlquist invoked his right to counsel, he asked the 
deputy what he was being questioned about. The deputy told 
Dahlquist he was being questioned about the death of Troy Weston. 
The deputy informed Dahlquist that he could not question him 
further because he had invoked his "lawyer privilege." Then the 
deputy allowed twenty four seconds of silence to elapse in the 
interrogation before he continued to advise Dahlquist of the "fact" 
that Dahlquist had been seen at the home of victim on the morning 
of the murder. Dahlquist replied to the deputy's statement without 
his requested counsel being present. This was a blatant violation 
of the Defendant's rights and the statement must be suppressed. 
Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 485 (1981), Minnick v. Mississippi, 
111 S.Ct. 486 (1990), Utah v. Sampson, 808 P.2d 1100 (Utah 1991). 
Dahlquist maintains that his reply to the deputy was not a 
statement, but was in the form of a question. However, the deputy 
and the prosecution construed the six words as a confession. The 
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trial court sanctioned the deputies actions and admitted the 
coerced statement. 
The entire interrogation lasted less than a couple of minutes. 
However, the prosecution used the statement to prove Dahlquist 
picked the victim up on the morning of the murder. In addition, 
the statement was used as a device to add credibility to the 
prosecution's argument that the two trials should not be severed. 
The prosecution's use of the statement provided the State with an 
argument that the totality of the circumstances between Dahlquist's 
statement and the co-defendant's confession (s) -1 showed 
interlocking evidence, reliability and the same criminal episode. 
This bolstered the prosecution's argument for a joint trial. 
Dahlquist's Fifth Amendment right to counsel was denied by the 
police officer's egregious indifference to Dahlquist's numerous 
requests for counsel; and the trial court approved the violations 
by denying Dahlquist's motions to suppress. Dahlquist presented 
two motions to suppress before the trial court. Each were denied. 
The trial court ruled Dahlquist made a knowingly and intelligent 
waiver of his right to counsel. 
The trial court erred by reviewing the motions to suppress 
under the prosecution's interpretation. The State submitted 
Dahlquist's interrogation fell under Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 
(1985) (Statements made without Miranda warnings, followed by 
. The co-defendant made fourteen separate 
statements/confessions. These included two interviews with the 
police and twelve letters to individuals, copied by the jail 
personnel. 
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Miranda warnings, waiver, and further statements). The State 
argued that Dahlquist knowingly waived his right to counsel when he 
asked "What am I being questioned about?" The State contends that 
the Defendant initiated the conversation by this question. The 
only conversation Dahlquist initiated was to clarify why he was 
being questioned. Detective Ward answered Dahlquist's question and 
then went on to remind Dahlquist that he had invoked his right to 
counsel. Therefore, the deputy could not continue the questioning 
under both federal and state law. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 485 
(1981), Minnick v. Mississippi, 111 S.Ct. 486 (1990), Utah v. 
Sampson, 808 P.2d 1100 (Utah 1991) . After a long pause the deputy 
again instituted questioning, confronting Dahlquist with a line 
that would invoke a question from any innocent man. The deputy 
specifically told Dahlquist that he had been seen picking up the 
victim. This was not a statement of "fact", but was actually a lie 
about the evidence the deputy had against Mr. Dahlquist. 
In reviewing this type of tactic, the Supreme Court found 
" [i]nterrogation may include both express questioning and police 
practices that are the functional equivalent of express 
questioning." United States v. McKneeley, 810 F. Supp 1537 (1993). 
Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300 (1980), defines 
"[s]tatements or actions of the police are the functional 
equivalent of express questioning if they are reasonably likely to 
elicit an incriminating response from the defendant." 
In this case the principles set forth in Innis apply. The 
officer did not expressly question Dahlquist, he used a tactic that 
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would likely bring a response from Dahlquist. This was done after 
Dahlquist had requested counsel numerous times. The officer 
expressly acknowledged Dahlquist's request for counsel and the 
officer's inability to further question Dahlquist because of the 
request. However, after acknowledging Dahlquist's rights, the 
officer went on to violate established case law and mandatory 
procedures. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 485 (1981), Minnick v. 
Mississippi, 111 S.Ct. 486 (1990), Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 
(1966), Utah v. Sampson, 808 P.2d 1100 (Utah 1991) 
The officer's further pursuit of interrogation was a direct 
violation of Dahlquist's Fifth Amendment right to counsel 
established in State v. Sampson, 808 P.2d 1100 (Utah 1991). 
Sampson established once a person invokes their right to counsel 
all questioning must cease. The officer in this case continued 
questioning. A direct violation of established legal principles. 
The correct response for the officer should have been to 
acknowledge that Dahlquist invoked his right to counsel, cease the 
interrogation and wait for Dahlquist's counsel to be present for 
further questioning. Both Federal and Utah case law require all 
questioning to cease until counsel for Dahlquist could be present 
for questioning. Minnick v. Mississippi, 111 S.Ct. 486 (1990), 
Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 485 (1981) . 
The State will contend that Dahlquist's statement is 
admissible under the three prong test. State v. Streeter, 900 P.2d 
1097, (Utah 1995), State v. Hilfiker, 868 P.2d 826 (Utah 1994). 
The State's argument fails the three prong test for admissibility. 
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Here, the officer initiated the conversation. After Dahlquist's 
request for an attorney was verified once again, "to be on the safe 
side," the officer tactically informed Dahlquist that he had been 
identified as picking up the victim the morning of the murder. 
This amounts to nothing more than initiated conversation by a law 
enforcement with the intent to elicit an incriminating statement. 
A direct violation of the first prong of the admissibility test. 
All three prongs of the test must be satisfied. Without the 
first prong the statement can not be admitted. It is not necessary 
to visit the remaining two prongs of the test. 
Dahlquist's statement must suppressed. The trial court failed 
to adequately analyze Dahlquist's statement under both Federal and 
Utah case law. The trial court admittedly took a "somewhat cursory 
review of the authorities," however, it failed to distinguish the 
State's obligation to preserve Dahlquist's Fifth Amendment right to 
counsel. (Hearing September 19, 1994, at 54). The trial court 
ignored the obvious, Dahlquist's five requests for counsel. To 
allow Dahlquist's statement to be admitted will legitimize 
Detective Ward's, and any other officer's, exploitation of the 
situation and violation of a Defendant's Fifth Amendment right 
against self incrimination and right to counsel. 
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ARGUMENT II 
DAHLQUIST WAS PREJUDICED BY THE TRIAL COURT'S 
FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE UTAH CODE WHICH 
DICTATES A SEVERANCE OF CO-DEFENDANTS' TRIALS 
TO INSURE JUSTICE. 
Dahlquist's right to a fair trial was violated by the trial 
court's failure to comply with U.C.A. § 77-8a-l. U.C.A. § 77-8a-l 
was legislated specifically to prevent the type of prejudice which 
occurred in this case. Utah law dictates that !! [w] hen two or more 
defendants are jointly charged with any offense they shall be tried 
jointly unless" separate trials are "consistent with the interest 
of justice." U.C.A. § 77-8a-l (2) (d) (1953 as amended). The 
statute allows for either the trial judge or motion by counsel to 
request separate trials. Id. The statute clarifies that upon a 
showing of potential prejudice to a defendant by a joint trial, 
"the court shall . . . grant a severance of defendants, or provide 
other relief as justice requires." U.C.A. § 77-8a-l (4)(a) (1953 
as amended). (Emphasis added). 
Here, counsel for Mr. Dahlquist filed two motions for 
severance stating numerous reasons a joint trial created prejudice. 
(Index 74-77, 224-25). Dahlquist's counsel cited the co-
defendants7 irreconcilable defenses, the multiple 
statements/confessions made by the co-defendant, the 
statements/confessions that co-defendant made to inculpate the 
defendant and lessen the blame on himself, and the almost certainty 
the co-defendant would be an unavailable witness. 
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The trial court attempted to resolve the above differences 
through redaction of the co-defendants statements and a limiting 
jury instruction. 
Dahlquist submits the trial court failed to provide relief 
that insured Dahlquist7s right to a fair trial. The trial court's 
lack of understanding for the need to sever is best shown by the 
trial court's scheduling to hear the final motion to sever after 
the jury had been selected, empaneled, and sworn. (R. Trial 138) 
The court placed itself in the awkward position of having to deny 
the motion to sever because jeopardy had already attached before 
the Court heard evidence on the issue of severance. 
Dahlquist's defense could not overcome the prejudice that was 
a result of the trial court's failure to sever the trial. The 
joint trial of the co-defendants resulted in the following 
violations of Dahlquist's constitutional rights. Addressed in 
Arguments III through VI. 
ARGUMENT III 
DAHLQUIST'S SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO 
CONFRONTATION WAS VIOLATED BY THE STATE'S 
ADMISSION OF THE NON TESTIFYING CO-DEFENDANT'S 
STATEMENTS AND CONFESSIONS. 
The Sixth Amendment through the Fourteenth Amendment provides 
that an individual in a state case has the right "to be confronted 
with the witnesses against him ..." In a joint trial a defendant 
is exposed to an unique situation when the co-defendant chooses not 
to testify, but the co-defendant has made prior statements or 
confessions the which the State wants to admit against only the co-
defendant. The defendant is left in a position of defending 
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against the co-defendant's confessions without the benefit of cross 
examination. 
BRUTON DOCTRINE 
The United States Supreme Court recognized this Sixth 
Amendment violation in Bruton v. United States, 3 91 U.S. 123 
(1968). (The Court found a facially incriminating confession by a 
co-defendant was a violation of defendant's Sixth Amendment right 
to confrontation of witnesses). The Bruton doctrine is very 
specific. Bruton is intended to protect a defendant from an 
obviously incriminating statement by a non testifying co-defendant. 
LEE V, ILLINOIS 
The Supreme Court revisited the Bruton doctrine and the Sixth 
amendment right to confrontation in Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530 
(1986). Lee found co-defendants' defenses become immediately 
antagonistic when faced with criminal process. JEd. at 545. The 
Court found the co-defendants' confession to be inherently 
untrustworthy due to the appearance that the confession attempts to 
mitigate the co-defendant's blame by shifting the blame to other 
parties or implicating a party out of retaliation. Jd. at 544. 
The Court found hearsay evidence as "substantive evidence 
against the accused" which violated the Confrontation Clause when 
the defendant was not allowed the opportunity to cross examine the 
co-defendant. 
The State of Illinois first argued that the confession bore 
sufficient indicia of reliability which overcame the question of 
trustworthiness. The State's second argument was the interlocking 
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theory by contending that if extrinsic evidence and the co-
defendant's confession interlocked at some points, the confession 
should be deemed trustworthy. Id. at 545. The Supreme Court was 
not persuaded by such arguments. 
RICHARDSON V, MARSH 
A year after Lee the Supreme Court handed down another 
decision regarding the Bruton doctrine and the Confrontation Clause 
of the Sixth Amendment in a joint trial. Richardson v. Marsh, 481 
U.S. 200, 95 L Ed. 2d 176, 107 S.Ct. 1702 (1987). Richardson 
reviewed a co-defendant's confession submitted at a joint trial. 
However, in this case the confession was redacted to omit any 
reference to the defendant. Further, the jury was given a limiting 
instruction that the co-defendant's confession was admitted as 
evidence against the co-defendant only. The Court found this 
procedure did not violate the Confrontation Clause. 
The Richardson case varies from Dahlquist's. In Richardson 
there were three co-defendants. Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 
95 L Ed. 2d 176 at 182, 107 S.Ct. 1702 (1987). Each co-defendant 
admitted to being present and taking part in the crime. The only 
question was the extent of defendant's knowledge and culpability. 
The co-defendant's confession did not allow the defendant to 
mitigate her culpability. 
The Supreme Court found the defendant's right to 
confrontation, under the Sixth Amendment, was not violated by the 
co-defendant's confession in redacted form when accompanied by a 
limiting instruction. 
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PRESENT CASE 
In the present case, the prosecution submitted that the 
curative instruction and redaction would comply with Richardson, 
thus not violating Dahlquist's Sixth amendment. The Richardson 
case varies from Dahlquist's. Dahlquist argued and maintained his 
situation was more analogous to Bruton and Lee, and as such 
demanded severance. 
Dahlquist should be considered under Lee. The State's 
position was that Richardson overruled Lee. Review of Richardson 
finds no mention of Lee. Richardson only mentions the Bruton 
doctrine. Comparison of Lee and Richardson finds that the two 
cases deal with completely different issues. Richardson argued the 
redaction of the defendant's name and existence circumvented the 
prejudice and incrimination prohibited by Bruton. Richardson v. 
Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 95 L Ed. 2d 176 at 181, 107 S.Ct. 1702 (1987) . 
However, Lee looks to the inherent trustworthiness of the co-
defendant's confession and the inability to confront the non 
testifying co-defendant. Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 541 
(1986). 
Richardson and Lee both stand as established case law. Each 
case is independent of the other and both cases are needed to 
protect a defendant in a joint trial. 
Dahlquist's situation falls directly under Lee. As in Lee, 
Dahlquist maintains the co-defendant's confessions lacked 
trustworthiness. The prosecution submitted that the statements/ 
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confessions were trustworthy. The State argued that it could offer 
testimony and evidence that would substantiate the co-defendants 
confessions. However, the only evidence the State had against 
Dahlquist was his vehicle spotted at the scene of the crime and his 
coerced interrogation statement. It did not occur to the trial 
court or the State to question the trustworthiness of fourteen 
different versions of statements/confessions by the co-defendant. 
The reason the statements/confessions interlocked with extrinsic 
evidence and testimony of State's witnesses was because the co-
defendant had total and accurate recall of the murder, by the Co-
defendant's own admissions, he was at the crime scene. The co-
defendant could construe his statements/confessions to mitigate his 
guilt and inculpate Dahlquist. 
The statements/confessions of the co-defendant do not pass the 
test of trustworthiness found in the Lee decision. Lee v. 
Illinois, 476 U.S. 530 at 544 (1986). The statements/confessions 
have the appearance of mitigating the co-defendant's blame, and 
spreading blame to Dahlquist. Id. 
Under established Federal and Utah law the co-defendant's 
confession did not meet the level of reliability that would allow 
admission. Yet the trial court allowed the confessions. 
Confessions that violated Lee. Confessions that violated U.C.A. § 
77-8a-l. 
The trial court simply ignored the fact the two defendants had 
antagonistic and irreconcilable defenses. The trial court erred on 
the side of judicial economy instead of the defendant's right to 
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due process. This directly violated Federal and State case law, 
and State statute. In the process Dahlquist's right to 
confrontation and his right to a fair trial were blatantly ignored. 
Dahlquist was further prejudiced by the admitted confessions 
when the co-defendant's counsel in closing used the confessions as 
a basis for mitigating the co-defendants guilt. See argument VI. 
ARGUMENT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO FOLLOW 
ESTABLISHED STATE LAW REGARDING SEVERANCE 
VIOLATED THE DEFENDANT'S SIXTH AMENDMENT AND 
UTAH CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION. 
Dahlquist's guaranteed right to confrontation was violated by 
the trial court's failure to follow established Utah State case 
law. The Utah Supreme Court cautioned trial courts to carefully 
consider defenses of co-defendants that appear to be inconsistent, 
obstruct or impede each other. Utah v. O'Brien, 721 P.2d 896 
(1986) (The Utah Supreme Court cited issues of irreconcilable 
defenses which would mandate severance). The test to determine 
whether severance of co-defendant's trials are required is stated 
clearly in O'Brien. The trial court must look at whether there is 
a conflict in the defenses of the co-defendants, if the defenses 
are irreconcilable, and whether the co-defendants' defenses are 
antagonistic. Id. The trial judge must weigh possible prejudice 
with judicial economy. Any "[d]oubts concerning prejudice should 
be resolved by the trial court in favor of [the] defendant." Utah 
v. O'Brien, 721 P.2d 896 (1986), State v. Collins, 612 P.2d 775 
(1980). The Utah Supreme Court found "trial courts often appear 
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to be reluctant to grant severance in cases involving joint 
defendants." O'Brien. The Court found such reluctance "ill-advised 
and in the long run risk[ed] greater expenditure of judicial 
resources." Id. 
The present case is a perfect example of a trial court's 
reluctance to severe joint trials. The defense presented evidence 
of prejudice regarding the co-defendant attempting to cast blame, 
inconsistent defenses (the co-defendant admitted being present and 
Mr. Dahlquist was not present at the time of the crime). Neither 
defendant could reconcile their defenses because they were directly 
opposed to each other. Mr. Telford's attorney's closing statement 
is a blaring example of just how inconsistent and antagonistic the 
defenses were. Mr. Dahlquist presented prejudices that could not 
be reconciled with his co-defendant's defense. However, the trial 
court chose the prosecution's argument that "holding the trials 
together [was] better for Mr. Dahlquist . . ." (R. Sept. 19, '94 at 
13) . However, this was not what the State intended. They knew 
that the strength of their case was weak against Mr. Dahlquist, and 
that evidence which was otherwise inadmissible, would come in 
against Mr. Dahlquist during a joint trial. The State said: 
... it is unfair to the public, your Honor, if we're 
forced to separate these trials, because it is our 
allegation that they committed the crime together. We 
think we're entitled to put in all of the evidence 
against both of them... the rules of evidence, if they're 
separated, somehow or other may end up prohibiting 
crucial evidence if we try them separately. That's been 
my concern all along. (R. March 28, '95 at 25). 
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Here, Dahlquist and the co-defendant were charged with the 
same criminal act. The state argued they had evidence and 
testimony which placed the co-defendants together on the day of the 
crime. The evidence amounted to eyewitness recollection of a 
Blazer like Dahlquist"s present at the murder scene.2 Review of 
the testimony established Dahlquist was never identified by the 
victim's parents or by an eyewitness at the scene of the crime as 
one of the individuals with the victim on the morning of the 
murder. In fact, the evidence was that Mr. Dahlquist did not match 
the description of the second suspect. 
The only witness to place Dahlquist with the co-defendant and 
the victim, was Jennifer Colantonio, the co-defendant's sister.3 
However, the testimony of Colantonio's bishop, Douglas Cannon, 
directly contradicted Colantonio's testimony. 
Mr. Dahlquist always claimed the co-defendant's defense was 
antagonistic, inconsistent and irreconcilable with Dahlquist's 
defense. Dahlquist contended he had an alibi. Dahlquist offered 
proof of that alibi. The co-defendant admitted he was present at 
the murder scene. The co-defendant's statements/confessions locked 
. Dahlquist, Trent Craig and Dahlquist's father testified 
Dahlquist's Blazer was used as a communal vehicle amongst his 
friends and acquaintances. 
3
. On the day of Colantonio' s testimony she was in custody, 
because of her prior failures to appear, and the night before she 
was to testify she overdosed. Colantonio's physical and mental 
capability was so poor that her testimony was reduced to the 
attorneys asking their prior questions from the preliminary hearing 
transcript and her reading of her prior responses off a copy of the 
preliminary transcript. 
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him into this fact. Dahlquist assertion of an alibi versus the co-
defendant's admissions of being present at the murder were 
irreconcilable. O'Brien dictates when there are such differences 
in defenses the trial court must sever the trials to remedy the 
over whelming prejudice to the co-defendants. O'Brien established 
that the two trials must be severed if a conflict in the 
defendants' respective positions at trial were of such a nature 
that, If considering all the evidence in the case, the defendants 
were denied a fair trial." Id. 
Further, Dahlquist questioned the credibility of the fourteen 
different statements/confessions made by the co-defendant to 
various individuals and authorities. Each statement/confession 
mitigated the culpability of the co-defendant and shifted the blame 
to Dahlquist. Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530 at 544 (1986). To 
demand the co-defendants remain together in a joint trial is in 
direct opposition to O'Brien. O'Brien established that casting 
blame on a co-defendant "is not alone sufficient reason to require 
severance of the co-defendants' trials." Id. O'Brien states the 
two defendants' must prove their defenses were irreconcilable. 
Here, the co-defendant implicated Dahlquist in the murder 
while mitigating his own actions through a variety of 
statements/confessions. Without severance, Dahlquist was forced in 
a position where he had to defend against the admitted 
statements/confessions without the benefit of cross examination. 
The co-defendant's defense of being a passive participant, was in 
complete opposition to Dahlquist's assertion of his alibi defense. 
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When viewed in the context of O'Brien, Dahlquist provided the trial 
court with more than enough evidence to question the prejudicial 
effect a joint trial. The trial court failed to follow the mandate 
of the Utah Supreme Court to review the defendants7 defenses and to 
sever the trials when a doubt as to prejudice occurred. 
Without severance of the co-defendants' trials, Dahlquist was 
placed in a position of proffering a defense against a co-defendant 
who admitted to being at the murder scene and witnessed another 
individual shoot the victim. The only other defendant at the 
defense table was Dahlquist. Dahlquist could not overcome the 
prejudice presented by the two defendants' different and 
inconsistent cases. 
The State's hidden agenda was quite obvious, when the county 
prosecutor, Jon Bunderson, said, fI[t]he practical effect on the 
jury of that [non severance] is the defendant's problem. We 
accomplish the goal of moving things along through the judicial 
system.11 (R. March 28, '95 at 40). In essence, the State got 
exactly what they wanted. Mr. Dahlquist was rushed through the 
judicial system, and convicted, on the coat tails of the co-
defendant; all for the sake of judicial economy. Perhaps, the most 
egregious example of the State's goal was the county prosecutor's 
cardboard container of files that displayed in bold letters 
"TELEQUIST" on two sides for the entire jury to view. (R. Trial at 
136-38, 404) . This is exactly what O'Brien was intended to 
prevent. 
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ARGUMENT V 
THE DEFENDANT'S SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO 
CONFRONTATION WAS VIOLATED WHEN THE TRIAL 
COURT ALLOWED THE CO-DEFENDANT'S CONFESSIONS 
INTO EVIDENCE UNDER AN EXCEPTION TO THE 
HEARSAY RULE. 
Utah Rules of Evidence allow for exceptions to hearsay when 
the declarant is unavailable. Utah R. Evid. 804. One such 
exception is a statement which at the time made, would subject the 
declarant to criminal liability, and a reasonable person would not 
have made such a statement. Utah R. Evid. 804(b)(3). 
In the present case, the State requested that two of the co-
defendants statements/confessions be admitted as evidence. 
Dahlquist objected on the grounds that it violated his right to 
confrontation. U.S. Const, amend. VI, Utah Const, art. I § 12. 
Bruton, Lee, State v. Menzies, 235 Utah Adv. Rep. 23 (1994) 
(Constitutionality of hearsay admitted as evidence is determined 
under a two prong test). 
The State contended that the co-defendant's 
statements/confessions were admissible as evidence because they 
were firmly rooted exceptions to the hearsay rule. Idaho v. 
Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990). (R. Sept. 19, ' 94 at 11). The State 
argued the co-defendant's statements/confessions fell under Rule 
804 (3) of the Utah Rules of Evidence, declarant unavailable. 
The Defendant argued the prosecution's interpretation of the 
admitted hearsay was incorrect. Defense cited Ohio v. Roberts, 448 
U.S. 56 (1980) and State v. Drawn, 791 P.2d 890 (1990), as the 
controlling case law against the prosecution's argument. (R. Sept. 
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19, ' 94 at 19). The Supreme Court in Roberts mandated a two prong 
test that must be met to guarantee the trustworthiness of a hearsay 
statement in order to insure that the statement does not violate 
the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 66. Under 
Roberts and Drawn the State must show "the witness's 
unavailability and [proof] that the statement bears adequate 
indicia of reliability." Drawn. 
In Drawn the Court looked at the United States Supreme Court's 
ruling in Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 541 (1986), which held 
that a co-defendant's admitted confession must have 
trustworthiness. Drawn. The Drawn Court found that "statements 
made in an obvious attempt to curry favor with the authorities by 
inculpating the defendant and exculpating declarant, lack 
trustworthiness. Id. 
When statements/confessions do not fall with in a firmly 
rooted hearsay rule they must be examined under the two prong test 
of Roberts and Drawn. Dahlguist asserted the co-defendant's 
statements/confessions must be subject to the two prong test to 
determine their trustworthiness before they can be admissible under 
804. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), Lee v. Illinois, 
476 U.S. 530, 541 (1986) and State v. Drawn, 791 P.2d 890 (1990). 
The shear number of statements/confessions which differ in 
varying degrees of involvement by the co-defendant completely 
destroys the statements/confessions ability to fall within a firmly 
rooted hearsay exception. Under the second prong of Roberts and 
Drawn the co-defendant's fourteen different statements/confessions 
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fail to meet the threshold standard of any indicia of reliability. 
Each statement progressively exculpates the co-defendant and 
inculpates Mr. Dahlquist deeper into the crime. 
In the present case, two of the statements/confessions were 
made to law enforcement. The other twelve statements/confessions 
were copies of letters sent by the co-defendant from the jail to 
individuals. Aside from the number and variety of 
statements/confessions, Dahlquist contends the circumstances 
surrounding the statements/confessions lack trustworthiness. In 
the interview the co-defendant voluntarily gave to police, prior to 
being charged with the murder, the co-defendant implicated Mr. 
Dahlquist and felt confident that law enforcement had no evidence 
against himself. In the next interview, the co-defendant 
apologized to the police for lying to them previous time(s). The 
co-defendant's letters were only samples of his attempts to 
persuade his friends of his innocence. None of these 
statements/confessions were taken under circumstances that 
guarantees any level of trustworthiness. 
The State's argument was not only did the co-defendant's 
statements/confessions fall under an exception to hearsay but that 
the statements/confessions met the standard for guaranteed 
trustworthiness. The State argued that the trial court must look 
at the totality of circumstances surrounding the 
statements/confessions of the co-defendant. (R. Sept. 19, '94 at 
14-17). The State proffered there was a "mountain of other 
evidence" against Dahlquist. (R. Sept. 19, '94 at 16). In making 
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such an argument, the State misconstrued the standard dictated in 
Wright, by which a statement/confession is determined to have a 
guarantee of trustworthiness. Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 
(1990). (R. Sept. 19, '94 at 11). The correct standard requires 
that the court view only the circumstances surrounding how the 
statements were made, to determined whether the declarant is 
particularly worthy of belief. Id. at 819. This is in direct 
conflict with what the State argued. 
"To be admissible under the Confrontation Clause, hearsay 
evidence used to convict a defendant must possess indicia of 
reliability by virtue of its inherent trustworthiness, not by 
reference to other evidence at trial." Wright at 822. None of 
these statements/confessions were taken under a circumstance that 
guarantees their trustworthiness. 
Dahlquist's right to confrontation was violated by the trial 
court's admission of the co-defendant's statements/confessions. 
Dahlquist's Sixth Amendment right was violated due to his inability 
to cross examine the co-defendant. Cross examination at trial 
would have been highly useful to probe the circumstances 
surrounding the confessions and the co-defendant's state of mind 
when he made the statements/confessions. Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 
805, 822 (1990) . 
Here, the prosecution used corroborating evidence to support 
the co-defendant's hearsay statements/confessions which permitted 
admission of presumptively unreliable statements/confessions by 
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"bootstrapping on the trustworthiness of other evidence at trial . 
. . " Id. at 823. 
For the statements/confessions of the co-defendant to be 
firmly rooted in a hearsay exception they must meet the two prong 
test. To rule otherwise opens the floodgates for untrustworthy 
confessions or statements admitted without any test for their 
reliability and trustworthiness. The Defendant asserts that this 
is exactly what happened in the present case. The co-defendant's 
redacted statements were against penal interest, but they also 
completely implicated Dahlquist while mitigating the co-defendant's 
actions. To allow such admissions of unreliable confessions was a 
violation of the Confrontation Clause. Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 
805, 822 (1990) . 
ARGUMENT VI 
THE CLOSING ARGUMENT OF THE CO-DEFENDANT'S 
COUNSEL VIOLATED THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO 
CONFRONTATION AND DUE PROCESS. 
The Sixth Amendment through the Fourteenth Amendment 
guarantees a defendant's right to confront witnesses brought 
against him by the State in a Criminal trial. Utah's Constitution 
further guarantees a defendant's right to confrontation by stating 
the accused shall have the right "to have compulsory process to 
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf . . . " Utah 
Const. Art 1, § 12. 
As cited in the arguments above, numerous Federal and State 
cases establish that a defendant's right to confrontation must be 
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protected. See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990), Richardson v. 
Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 95 L Ed. 2d 176 at 182, 107 S. Ct. 1702 (1987), 
Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, (1986), Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 
(1980), State v. Menzies, 235 Utah Adv. Rep. 23 (1994), State v. 
Drawn, 791 P.2d 890 (1990). 
The closing argument by counsel for the co-defendant violated 
Mr. Dahlquist's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. It is 
conceded that counsel for both sides has considerable latitude and 
freedom in closing arguments. State v. Lafferty, 749 P. 2d 1239 
(1988) . Counsel may discuss evidence, inferences and deductions 
arising from the evidence. Id. However, in the present case, the 
co-defendant's counsel, Mr. Bouwhuis, used evidence in his closing 
argument that had not been admitted during the trial. Mr. Bouwhuis 
addressed the jury and stated the co-defendant was afraid to be 
taken to the Weber County Jail because Mr. Dahlquist was housed at 
the Weber County Jail. (R. Trial at 1634) . Mr. Bouwhuis used this 
issue to bolster admitted evidence, from a jailhouse snitch, that 
Dahlquist threatened the co-defendant's life. In State v. Tillman 
the prosecutor's actions that called attention of the jurors to 
matters that they would not be justified in considering to 
determine their verdict was serious error. State v. Tillman, 750 
P. 2d 546 (1988) . Evidence brought into the closing argument by the 
prosecutor that was not part of the trial was found to be 
reversible error in State v. Bailey, 647 P.2d 170 (Az. 1982). 
Mr. Bouwhuis7 closing arguments converted the redacted 
statements into obvious incriminating statements against the 
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defendant in direct violation of the Defendant's his Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendments and Art I Section 12 of the Utah State 
Constitution. 
The influence of Mr. Bouwhuis' closing argument was so 
prevailing upon the jury that it completely undermined Mr. 
Dahlquist's defense. An analogy could be made regarding the 
misconduct of a prosecutor in the above case and the conduct of co-
defendant 7s counsel. To allow such misconduct without determining 
it reversible error destroys the protection of co-defendants7 due 
process rights. 
In a joint trial, such as the present case, the latitude and 
freedom given to a co-defendant's counsel must be weighted against 
Mr. Dahlquist's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. The trial 
court must safeguard the defendant's due process rights to a fair 
trial and impartial jury. In the present case, Mr. Dahlquist's 
counsel objected to Mr. Bouwhuis' closing. Objections were made 
due to the obvious violation of the trial court's instructions on 
the redacted statements. Further Mr. Bouwhuis' closing argument 
was littered with his own opinion of what happened at the murder 
scene. Mr. Bouwhuis accomplished what the county prosecutor could 
not have attempted. To bring in every shred of evidence regarding 
Mr. Dahlquist and to validate the evidence with counsel's own 
opinion. 
The trial court's failure to sever the trials was a complete 
disregard of Mr. Dahlquist's right to due process and his right to 
confront witnesses. The closing arguments of the co-defendant's 
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counsel were an eloquent example of what becomes of a joint trial 
when the trial court fails to sever the trials when a showing of 
prejudice is made by the defense. O'Brien establishes that if 
defenses of the co-defendants are irreconcilable, in conflict with 
each other, and/or antagonistic, the trial court must sever to 
prevent prejudice. Utah v. O'Brien, 721 P.2d 896 (1986) 
Mr. Dahlquist requested severance of the trial twice before 
the trial began. Through out the trial Mr. Dahlquist's counsel 
objected and requested mistrials due to the trial court's failing 
to sever the trials. As cited in Argument III the main thrust of 
the State's reason for joinder was judicial economy. However, the 
State received another benefit, the co-defendants were reduced to 
pointing fingers at each other. The end result was Mr. Dahlquist's 
conviction of a crime on inadmissible evidence and opinion. 
ARGUMENT VII 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED IT#S DISCRETION WHEN IT 
SENTENCED THE DEFENDANT TO A ONE TO FIVE YEAR 
CONSECUTIVE SENTENCE FOR THE DEFENDANTS USE 
OF A FIREARM UNDER § 76-3-203 U.C.A. (1953) 
The trial court erred when it enhanced the appellant's 
sentence on count I, First Degree Murder, under § 76-3-203 U.C.A. 
In enhancing the Defendant's sentence, the trial court stated: 
"With the firearm enhancement I'll assess an 
indeterminate term of not less than one nor more than 
five years. ... A minimum of one, a maximum of five 
indeterminate." (R. May 30, '95 at 16, 18). 
It is clear from the trial court's sentence that the appellant 
was sentenced to an indeterminate term of one to five years for his 
use of a firearm. However, § 76-3-203, does not allow for the 
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imposition of a sentence of one to five years. Under § 76-3-203 
U.C.A., the trial court's only discretion lies in sentencing the 
defendant for an indeterminate term of not more than five years, or 
for a determinate term of not more than one year. State v. 
Willett, 694 P.2d 601 (Utah 1984). 
Although section 76-3-203(1) U.C.A. appears clear on its face, 
many trial courts have erred in its application. State v. Willett, 
694, P.2d 601 (Utah 1984); State v. Cobb, 774 P.2d 1123 (Utah 
1989) . Chief Justice Zimmerman said it best when he wrote, 
"Section 76-3-203, with its subparts, is a classic example of a 
statute enacted piecemeal." State v. Willett, 694, P.2d 601 (Utah 
1984) As a result of the confusion regarding sentencing under 
Section 76-3-203(1) U.C.A., the case law is very clear and 
undisputed. The trial court erred when it sentenced the appellant 
to an indeterminate term of a minimum of one year and a maximum of 
five years consecutive, for his use of a firearm. The maximum 
sentence the court could have given under 76-3-203 U.C.A. was one 
year or for an indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run 
consecutively and not concurrently. Id. at 603; Cobb supra at 
1126. Therefore, the only way to correct his obvious error is to 
remand the case to the trial court for resentencing consistent with 
U.C.A. § 76-3-203. To do otherwise is a direct violation of Mr. 
Dahlquist's right to due process. 
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CONCLUSION 
ARGUMENT I 
The Appellant's motions to suppress were improperly denied. 
The trial court's failure to suppress the Appellant's coerced 
interrogation statement violated the Appellant's right to counsel 
guaranteed under the Fifth Amendment. The admitted statement 
unduly prejudiced the Appellant's case. The Appellant's conviction 
should be reversed on the basis that his constitutional right to 
counsel was violated. 
ARGUMENT II 
The Appellant was unduly prejudiced by the trial court's 
failure to comply with U.C.A. § 77-8a-l. The Utah Code 
specifically dictates a severance of co-defendants' trials to 
insure justice. The Appellant's defense could not overcome the 
prejudice that was a result of the joint trial. As such, the 
Appellant's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation was violated. 
The Appellant's conviction should be reversed on the basis that his 
constitutional right to confrontation was violated. 
ARGUMENT III 
The Appellant's motions to sever were improperly denied. The 
Appellant's Sixth Amendment right to confront and cross examine 
witnesses was violated by the admission of the non testifying co-
defendant's conflicting statements and confessions. The trial court 
failed to adhere to established Federal case law that mandates the 
severance of co-defendants. The Appellant's conviction should be 
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reversed, the Appellant was unduly prejudiced by the trial court's 
failure to grant the severance motions. 
ARGUMENT IV 
The Appellant's motions to sever were improperly denied. The 
trial court failed to follow established Utah case law which 
mandates the severance of co-defendants when their defenses are in 
conflict, are irreconcilable or antagonistic. The Appellant 
established the co-defendants and his defenses were irreconcilable, 
antagonistic, and conflicted. The Appellant's Sixth Amendment 
right to confrontation and his Fourteenth Amendment right to due 
process was denied do to the trial court's failure to sever the 
joint trials. The violation of Appellant's constitutional rights 
to confrontation and due process warrant a reversal of the 
Appellant's conviction. 
ARGUMENT V 
The trial court violated the Appellant's Sixth Amendment right 
to confrontation by allowing admission, of the co-defendant's 
statements/confessions, under an exception to the Hearsay Rule. 
Utah R. Evid. 804 (b) (3) . The statements/confessions failed to 
meet the standards mandated by both Federal and State law for 
exceptions to the Hearsay Rule. The Appellant was unduly 
prejudiced by the admission of the co-defendant's 
statements/confessions. It is reversible error to allow the 
statements/confessions as evidence. The violation of Appellant's 
right to confrontation warrants the reversal of the conviction. 
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ARGUMENT VI 
The Appellant's right to confrontation was violated by the 
closing argument of the co-defendant's counsel. Through the 
closing argument the co-defendant's counsel accomplished what the 
prosecution could not have done, offer opinion and inadmissible 
evidence of the Appellant's guilt. The Appellant was unduly 
prejudiced by the closing argument. The violation of Appellant's 
right to confrontation and due process warrants the reversal of the 
conviction. 
ARGUMENT VII 
The trial court improperly sentenced the Appellant under § 76-
3-203 U.C.A. The trial court's only discretion lies in sentencing 
the defendant for an indeterminate term of not more than five 
years, or for a determinate term of not more than one year. The 
Appellant's case should be remanded back to the District Court for 
further sentencing in compliance with § 76-3-203 U.C.A. 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM "A" 
Record ID Number: 1640 
Description: (See below) 
NTOLVEMENTS: 
ype Record # Date Description Relationship 
LW 94-0C423 0 3/17/94 Homicide Statement/Interview 
escription: 
tatement of Brandon Dalquist-Interview by Dale Ward 
ale- Were at the Box Elder County Sheriff's Office. The date is 3/15/94 
resent are Deputy's Dale Ward and Jim Summerill and Brandon Dalguist. 
s that correct Brandon? 
randon- Yes. 
ale- Uh, what is your date of birth Brandon? 
randon- August 10th, 74. 
ale- Ok, and do you have a social security number? 
randon- 5 29-7 3-5134 
le- Ok. Urn, Brandon were going to visit with you en acouple of matters 
iid and uh before we do that 1 think we should advise you of your 
ights. 
randon- Yesr I would like a lawyer present. 
ale- You would like a lawyer present? 
randon- Yep. 
ale- Ok, now let me read you your rights and well get to that part. 
ou have the right to remain silent anything you say can be used against 
ou in a court of law, you have the right to talk to a lawyer and have 
im present with you while you are being questioned. If you cannot 
fford to hire a lawyer, one will be appointed to represent you before 
our are questioning if you wish one. Do you understand? You can 
efuse to answer any questions and or stop giving this statement any 
ime you want to. 
randon- Yes. 
ale- You understand that? Do you understand each of these rights as I 
ave explained them to ya? 
randon- Yes. 
wile- Ok, having these rights in mind, do you wish to talk to us at 
his time? 
don- Uh, with a lawyer present. 
- Ok. Would you just sign that for me right there. 
don- What am I being questioned about? 
- We wanted to discuss the situation with you about Troy Weston, 
well, urn, you probably already know that he is deceased? 
don- Yes I know. I don't know anything about thar. 
- And uh, thats what we wanted to question you about. But uh you've 
'Iked your lawyer privilege so, uh we can't ask you any questions but 
,don- To be on the safe side. 
- but I would like to advise you of acouple things and 
. urn, one of the things that I need to advise you of is that the morning 
Saturday morning the day that that Troy came up missing, you were 
itified as being at the home not once but twice. 
idon- I picked him up that morning. 
i- Ok. You-also need to know that you and your vehicle were 
itified at the scene of the crime. 
idon- Shouldn't of been. I I would don't would like a lawyer. 
i- Ok. And the interview will end. The time is 1C:28 AM. 
7/94 Typed by BH 
ADDENDUM "B" 
TRANSCRIPT 
MARCH 28, 1995 
that they committed the crime together. We think 
we're entitled to out in all of the evidence aaainst 
3| both of them. Th of evidence, if the v•re 
4 i separated, somehow or other may end up prohibiting 
! 
5 crucial evidence if we try them separately. That's 
6 I been my concern all along. 
7 I THE COURT: I'm going to take a recess for a few 
8 1 minutes. I want to review the file. Obviously this 
motion affects where we go as far as the other 
10 | motions. I'm going to review that for a few minutes 
11| before we proceed. Court will be in recess. 
THE BAILIFF: Court will be in recess. 
13 j (Shortrecess.) 
14 THE COURT: Counsel, I've considered the matter. 
15 I think counsel have very capably pointed out the 
16 difficulties with the issue and the motion. 
17 Probably the single most important 
18 ingredient for a judge is to be fair. I recognize 
19 that there's a considerable fairness argument here. 
20 But fairness applies across the board. I think I may 
21 have been presented what is essentially a Hobson's 
22 choice here, because the continuance creates its own 
23 set of problems and appealable issues. 
24 After considering the matter, I'm denying 
25 the motion. The trial will go forward next Monday 
l| These cases allow exactly what we have 
2 | proposed to do. It doesn't matter whether there's 
3 I three or ten c o - d e f e n d a n t s . It doesn't matter to what 
4 I extent the confession may or may not incriminate one 
5 I or the other defendants. The rule is laid out very 
clearly in Nield and in Richardson vs. Marsh. If the 
statements are redacted and if there is a limiting or 
8 I cautionary instruction, that's it. The law allows 
9 that to happen. 
10 The practical effect on the jury of that 
11 is the defendant's problem. We accomplish the goal of 
12 moving things along through the judicial system 
13 appropriately and at the same time solve the 
14 confrontation issue. Like I say. it's subject to some 
15 criticism as being c y n i c a l , and it's true that the 
16 trial judge does have the discretion whether to grant 
17 separate trials, but in effect what these cases are 
18 saying to a trial judge is if you want to go ahead 
19 with a joint trial, then you can do it and we're not 
20 going to overturn your d e c i s i o n so long as the 
21 statements are properly redacted and you have given a 
22 cautionary instruction. We'll allow you trial judges 
23 to move along and we are going to still worship at the 
24 altar of judicial economy. That's in effect what the 
25 appelate courts are saying. 
l| think tha: we can under any circumstances limit 
2 | cross-exa-iinacion here and say that all I can do is 
ask questions strictly on the very words, nothing 
more, nothing less, that they'll say on the witness 
5 I stand. I haven't seen that, in my limited experience, 
6 in any t r i =! . Certainly where it goes to the heart of 
7 his defense that shouldn't be allowed. I don't see 
8 how the court can rule that I'll be limited on my 
9 cross-examination simply to the words that the 
10| witnesses say. 
THE COURT: The court will rule as follows. I'm 
12| going to require that the trials not be severed, that 
we go forward. I will require the redaction of all of 
141 Telford's statements so as to eliminate any reference 
15 to Dahlquist. 
16 MR. SNIDER: I think not only reference, but his 
17 existence also. 
18 THE COURT: I understand that. I'll require that 
19 the proposed redacted statements be provided to the 
20 defense counsel, Mr. Bunderson, tomorrow evening, five 
21 o'clock. Will that be sufficient time? 
22 MR. BUNDERSON: The only limiting factor, Your 
23 Honor, is the availability of the typist. 
24 THE COURT: You may have to hire a separate 
25 typist if necessary. We're in a time crunch here. 
yesterday and reviewed the transcript. I think chat's 
attached to your original motion. 
MR. SNIDER: It is. I have a tape of the 
41 interview. The transcript, although in context -- I 
5 mean, in transcript form it reads exactly as the tape. 
6 I don't dispute that. But I'd like the court to 
7 follow that as I play the tape. And the tape needs to 
3 be made part of this record, because the tape clearly 
9 reflects exactly what happened and that is not 
10 reflected in what I would call a sterile transcript. 
11 THE COURT: I'll allow you to play the tape. 
12 MR. SNIDER: Okay. It is over here. If the 
13 court can't hear this I can certainly move it to where 
14 the court can. 
15 (Pause in the proceedings.) 
16 THE COURT: I'll ask the court reporter to 
17 transcribe this tape as it is played. 
18 MR. BUNDERSON: May I approach the bench so I can 
19 hear it better and read along with the copy of the 
20 transcript? 
21 THE COURT: I'll allow counsel to do that. The 
22 problem is if I have you standing between the machine 
23 and the reporter that will compound the acoustical 
24 problem. If you want to stand just nearby so he can 
25 hear it also. 
MR. BOUWKUIS: If I may also approach, Your 
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THE COURT: Yes. 
(Pause in the proceedings.) 
MR. SNIDER: I think Mr. Ward has the original 
tape with him. 
MR. BUNDERSON: So the court is aware, if I may, 
there is no new issue raised that I see. The court 
has already ruled on this, except for an alleged 24 
seconc cap As far as we can tell, the allegation is 
that that: gap occurs, if you have the transcript, in a 
statement made by Dale Ward about the fourth and fifth 
lines on the second page. 
THE COURT: Yes, that's my understanding. 
MR. BUNDERSON: We'd ask the court to listen 
carefully. We think that there's writing going on 
during that gap. 
MR. SNIDER: There is. 
MR. BUNDERSON: That Mr. Dahlquist is writing or 
s igning. 
MR. SNIDER: No, that Mr. Ward is writing 
something. You hear some writing in the background. 
THE COURT: Do we need to play the entire 
interview, then? 
MR. SNIDER: No. It's only about a minute and a 
half long. I would also like the court cc notice how 
many times my client invokes his right to counsel even 
D c t O T c q u e s u i o n i n g c e g i n s think t h a t 
i m p e r a t i v e and is not an i s s u e that was a d d r e s s e d 
p r i o r 
10 
(Tape played.; 
"DALE; We're at the Box Elder Conty sheriff's 
office. The date is 3/15/9 4. Present are Deputy's 
Dale 17 a r d and Jim Summerill and Brandon Dahlquist. 
that correct, Brandon? 
BRA ND GN: Y e s . 
wriai is your c a t e o z z i r c n , cranaon 
BRANDON: A u a u s t 10th, 
DALE: Okay. Do you have a Social Security 
15 n u m D e r t 
D A L E : O k a y . B r a n d o n , w e ' r e g o i n g to v i s i t with 
y o u a b o u t a c o u p l e of m a t t e r s . B e f o r e we do t h a t , I 
13 | think we should advise you of your rights. 
^ 0 | BRANDON: Y e s . I would like a lawyer present." 
;1| MR. SNIDER: He invokes his rights. 
"DALE: You would like a lawyer present? 
23 i BRANDON: Yep. 
2 4 | DALE: Let me read to you your rights and we'll 
251 get to that part. You have the right to remain 
silent. Anything you say can be used against you in a 
court of law. You have the right to calk to a lawyer 
and have him present with you while being questioned. 
j. z ycu cannoc a i. .»_ o r c to :iirs a ^ a w y e r one wij_j_ o e 
appointed to represent you before any questioning. Do 
you understand? You can refuse to answer any 
questions or stop giving this statement any time you 
w a n t t o . 
BRANDON; Yes, I understand. 
DALE: Do you understand each of these rights 
that I've explained to you? 
DRni'jjON: i 6 S . 
DALE: Having these rights in mind, do you wish 
to talk to us at this time? 
BRANDON: With a lawyer present. 
DALE: Okay. Would you just sign that for me 
r igh t there. 
BRANDON: What am I being questioned about? 
DALE: We wanted to discuss the situation with 
you about Troy Weston. You probably already know that 
he is deceased," 
MR. SNIDER: That's the pause we want to talk 
about right there, Your Honor. The State's objection 
to our motion is based upon the fact that they say Mr. 
Dahlquist initiated the conversation. He invoked his 
right to counsel and then he initiated the 
conversation. That is what the transcript looks like. 
3| But Mr. Dahlquist invoked his right to counsel and 
4| under the law. and I think Edwards is specifically 
5 I right on point, the singular event which may occur is 
for the defendant to consult with counsel. That's it. 
7 There was no requirement for him to read Miranda. 
8 In fact, Edwards goes on and argues that 
9 neither the passage of time, however great, nor the 
10 administration of additional Miranda warnings will 
11 allow officers to begin interrogation anew unless the 
12 suspect has been given a chance to consult with an 
13 attorney. 
14 We need to go back and look at the first 
15 time he invoked his right to counsel. It was before 
16 Miranda. He invoked it and it is unequivocal that he 
17 invoked it. It's not a question that I think I'd like 
18 to. It was right on point, I want an attorney. In 
19 fact, the officer paused and said, well, okay, but let 
20 me read you the Miranda rights. There was no reason 
21 to do that. 
22 MR. BUNDERSON: This is the same argument. We've 
23 already resolved this. 
24 MR. SNIDER: That's where Miranda should have 
25 taken effect and that's where the questioning should 
have stocoed was a police officer for over five 
2 I years. I was an investigative police officer for ove 
3! ten years. My investigator in this case was a police 
officer for over ten years. Ke unequivocally 
requested counsel and there's no question the 
questioning should have stopped. But assuming he 
didn't, the only way the State can get --
THE C C J R T : If you're not going to play any more 
9 I of the tape, go back to the podium cr to your table. 
10| MR. SNIDER: That's fine. I'm sorry. The only 
reason the State can — after my client invoked his 
Miranda rights, the only way the State can even 
13I vaguely argue that his statements cculd come in is if 
14 Mr. Dahlquist unequivocally initiated the questioning 
15 again. 
16 If you listen to the tape, Detective Ward 
17 says I want you to read this, I want you to sign it. 
18 You can hear Brandon signing. I think he's reading 
19 the Miranda and then is probably signing it. But 
20 while signing it he says what am I being questioned 
21 about. Detective Ward says you are being questioned 
22 about the death of Troy Weston. Then that's it. My 
23 client asked a question and the question was answered. 
24 Then for 24 seconds nothing happens. My 
25 client doesn't ask another question, my client signs 
his name. You can listen to the tace if vou would 
like, back it up a little bit, and there's a pause. 
Maybe he's scaring at the detective and thinking. 
okay. I've done it. I've signed and asked for an 
attorney. Then the detective initiates the 
6| conversation and says, w e l l , you probably know that 
71 we, and goes on and confronts him, not with truth, but 
3 with direct lies, because the State does not have a 
9 witness that can put my client at the crime scene. 
10 They don't know that then and do not have anybody that 
11 will say my client was present when the victim was 
12 picked up that morning. 
13 I have interviewed their witnesses and 
14 they don't say that. The witnesses say that the 
15 defendant's truck was there. That is direct 
16 interrogation techniques. Detective Ward even admits 
17 that they are techniques. Confront people with what 
18 we believe to be the truth and we'll decide whether or 
19 not they're denying it or admitting it. 
20 My client asked a question and the 
21 question was answered. There was a long pause. My 
22 client had done everything to invoke his Miranda 
23 rights. Then the detective initiated questioning 
24 after my client had invoked his Miranda rights at 
25 least four times. Short of getting up and walking out 
f the interview room, I don't think my client could 
have done anything else. 
MR. 3UNDER SON: Your Honor, I don't see one thing 
different that has been presented by this gap that 
5| wasn't presented at the earlier hearing en this very 
6 | issue. We argued it and the court made its ruling. 
7 I Counsel doesn't have the right to just keep bringing 
3 it up again and again, unless there's something 
9 substantially different or substantially new or 
10 however you want to phrase it. 
11 If you go to the secend page cf the 
12 transcript, the beginning line says "Brandon: With a 
13 lawyer present." Dale Ward says, "Ckay. Would you 
14 just sign that for me right there." Then there's a 
15 gap of about two to three seconds, if the court were 
16 to listen to the tape again, and that is when Brandon 
17 Dahlquist initiates further conversation. He says, 
18 "What am I being questioned about?" Dale Ward 
19 promptly answers, "We want to discuss the situation 
20 with you about Troy Weston." Then there's another gap 
21 of about 11 seconds, not 24. It's no where near 24 
22 seconds. The court can time it. I did as you were 
23 listening to it. There's no way that anybody could 
24 think that's 24 seconds, unless they're measuring 
25 meters somehow, or miles. 
T-J ^ -7-5 
T r» e n D a 1,- "r a r d continues with the sa^e 
thought , " y* ^ -11, you or o b a b 1 y k now he's decease d , " and 
it goes . > n f r o ^  there. out the initiation occurs 
before that gap. It has nothing to do with that gap. 
And, secondly, that gap has nothing to do with 
anything. It ' s simply Dale Ward getting a lot more 
credit for interrogation techniques than he should 
get. I've talked to him about that. That's exactly 
what he said. 
This gap is the only new issue that is 
raised and it has nothing to do with the court's 
ruling earlier, which was that Mr. Dahlquist initiated 
the conversation because he initiated the 
conversation up above. 
MR. SNIDER: I think the gap is exactly on point. 
The gap shows that Mr. Dahlquist asked a simple 
question. Mr. Dahlquist was originally arrested on a 
warrant for forgery. He had not been questioned 
regarding the forgery and had not been questioned 
regarding anything. This was the first time the 
police officer had an 'opportunity to talk with him. 
He specifically asked what am I being questioned 
about. Detective Ward specifically answers that 
question. That is it. The interview is over. 
Detective Ward w a i t s , and I've timed this 
twice, I got 2 2 seconds once and 2 4 seconds the second 
time. Perhaps Mr. Bunder son's on standard Box Elder 
time. I don't know. But there is a pause and it is a 
long pause and it's an uncomfortable pause because 
Detective Ward then says, well, umm, and then he 
initiates the conversation again. There's no i f s , 
anas or buts, Your Honor. Detective Ward initiated 
the questioning after a clear invoking of the right to 
counsel 
M L'iK . D U N D E R 3 01 W hat was a o i n c on d u r i n c t h a 
or 12 second g a p , Y o u r H o n o r , was t h a t , and 
pre 
e S s y. t h i s , and we can p u t it on as e s L i m o n v 'OU 
l i k e , is that M r . D a h l q u i s t w a s w r i t i n g s o m e t h i n g . To 
w h a t e v e r e x t e n t , for w h a t e v e r r e a s o n , t h e r e ' s a gap 
i o | and I a s s u m e that had s o m e t h i n g to do w i t h i t . I 
i o | a s s u m e t h a t M r . Ward was w a i t i n g for h i m to f i n i s h 
th at w r i t i n g or that t h o u g h t . It is not an 
1 8 | i n t e r r o g a t i o n t e c h n i q u e . It w a s n o t t h o u g h t out on 
19| the part of Dale Ward. 
20| Even if it were, even if he thought about 
21| it, so what? He's through, he's done. This guy won't 
zz| talk to me. Then Mr. Dahlquist says. "What am I being 
23| questioned about?" He initiates the conversation, 
4 4 | That's the crux, that's the key, to the whole issue of 
whether or not this should be admitted. That has 
nothing to do with this gap. That is an initiation b 
2 the defendant. That's the key, the basis upon which 
3 the court made the earlier decision and is the reason 
4 that the decision should remain unchanged. 
5 THE COURT: The court is going to affirm its 
6 previous decision. As I look at that, counsel, 
7 there's no question that he invoked his right more 
8 than once, but it seems to the court a critical point 
9 occurred when the defendant then propounds the 
10 question "What am I being questioned about." At that 
11 point it would appear to the court that the officer i 
12 responding to that question and doesn't respond with 
13 question. Ke responds with an answer to that 
14 question. For that reason I'm going — I recognize 
15 there's an argument there, but I'm going to — 
16 MR. SNIDER: We would move to have the tape 
17 admitted into evidence. Not for the purpose of 
18 presenting at trial, but for the purpose of appeal. 
19 There is a pause there and that needs to be included 
20 in the record for the a p p e a l . 
21 MR. BUNDERSON: We'll have it available for the 
22 trial. 
23 THE COURT: Do you want to have it marked and 
24 admitted now or have it for the trial? 
25 MR. SNIDER: I think it should be done now, Your 
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perhaps difficult to know which family is suffering 
the worst out of all this. 
If anything is clear, it's the evil that 
drugs can create and the suffering and unhappiness 
they caused for three young men. essentially 
destroying three lives, not just one. Unlike other 
games, drugs are a thing that people choose. They 
choose to become involved in it 
by using, selling, distributing. 
I think, Brandon, you have a lot of good 
qualities that your family has outlined and hopefully 
at some point in your life you will be able to put 
those to good use and to lead a productive life. That 
may be quite some time from now, but hopefully you'll 
be able to do that. That is something Troy Weston 
won't be able to do. 
MR. DAHLQUIST: Yeah. 
THE COURT: Based upon the conviction of first 
degree murder, I sentence the defendant to a term of 
five years to life in the Utah State Prison. That 
sentence is to run consecutive with the current 
sentence for the reasons I've indicated. With the 
firearm enhancement I'll assess an indeterminate term 
of not less than one nor more than five years. 
Page 16 
does that mean the county will reimburse all of my 
clients, if they are acquitted, for the attorney fees 
l 
3 I that they have to impose? 
4 J THE COURT: We normally impose an assessment. I 
5 1 recognize it isn't in these sums, but the amount 
6 incurred isn't this great either. I'll certainly 
7 allow a restitution hearing on the issue or maybe you 
8 J and Mr. Bunderson can talk. We can explore that 
9 further if we need to. 
10 i MR. BUNDERSON: Just so I understand, the five to 
11 i life is consecutive to what he's already serving? 
12 I THE COURT: Yes; ** 
i3 | MR. BUNDERSON: And-you are imposing a one ye 
14 | consecutive firearm enhancement? 
THE COURT: A minimum of one. a maximum of f 
indeterminate . 
MR. BUNDERSON: But that's consecutive also? 
THE COURT: Yes. I think the statute requires 
that to be consecutive. 
MR. SNIDER: If I may have a moment? 
(Pause in the proceedings-) 
MR. SNIDER: Okay. Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: That will be the sentence of the 
cour t . 
(Concluded at 3:30 p.m.) 
TRANSCRIPT 
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1 his dog. He will testify to what he saw. 
2 We will then call experts on fingerprints — 
3 fingerprint analysis. The medical examiner will testify 
4 as to the :r:se of death. And we also have the 
5 defendant's sister, who saw these two on the way out with 
6 the person that we allege as the victim. She testified at 
7 the preliminary hearing. We have a couple of other 
8 witnesses who saw these two with the vehicle that was 
9 involved in the killing. One of those people testified at 
10 the preliminary hearing, the major witness. And we have 
11 got one other witness whom we have intearviewed on a couple 
12 of occasions who didn't testify at prelim because he 
13 didn't show up. But he would testify as to these two 
14 being together and beating up the victim at a party a week 
15 or two before this particular event. 
16 Now that's, in essence, the type of testimony 
17 we're putting on. There were something like 40 to 60 
18 people who were either interviewed or contacted the police 
19 or contacted by the police. Most of them were, in our 
20 opinion, sent there or drummed up by Mr. Telford in an 
21 attempt to come up with an alibi, all of which has been 
22 considered basically to be garbage. They have all those 
23 statements. 
24 I don't suppose that Mr. Telford is going to 
25 attempt to come up with an alibi defense, although that's 
COMPUTER-AIDED TRANSCRIPTION 9 
1 up to the defense because what he tried didn't work. He 
2 has got three of four different versions of an alibi, 
3 ranging from he wasn't there to he was here, he was in 
4 several different places all at the same time. That's 
5 where most of the running around, if you will, of the 
6 false leads came from. And again, counsel has copies of 
7 all the interviews that have been done. All those 
8 witness's names. 
9 That's basically the sort of case we're going to 
10 present. Those are the sort of witnesses. I hope that 
11 helps the court decide, to some extent, why a private 
12 investigator may be needed or may not be needed. At least 
13 where the private investigator's work would be somewhat 
14 crucial since the taxpayers are paying for it. I don't 
15 know that an investigator should be able to do whatever he 
16 or she wants to do, and I'm not at all sure that it has 
17 been proven to the standard set in the Wasatch County 
18 case. 
19 The Wasatch County case — I don't recall the 
20 name of it exactly — it is -quoted in my brief. I don't 
2*1 khow that that standard has even been met by the defense. 
22 But as far as the issue of private investigator, that's 
23 basically the sort of information I think the court needs 
24 to be aware of. I would be glad to answer any questions 
25 if you have any. 
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1 7¥LE CLERF : Case number -4130CC43, State of U t a h 
2 vs. Brandon Cahlquist, and case number 941000 0 44, 
3 Staca of Utah vs. Telford. 
4 THE COURT: The record should reflect chat the 
5 defendants are both present. Counsel, if you will 
6| state your names for the record. 
7| MR. BUNDERSON: Jon Bunderson appearing for the 
3 plaintiff. 
9 i MR. SNIDER: Kent Snider on behalf of Mr. 
10 ~ahicruist. 
11 MR. BOUWKUIS: Mike Bouwhuis for the defendant 
12 "ravis Telford. 
J> i THE COURT: We have a five d a v *ur v trial 
1 4 ' scheduled to begin next Monday morning. This is the 
i 
1 5 , cime set for hearing on several motions. I've 
i 
1 
IS reviewed the file in Mr. Dahlauist's case. There is a 
i / motion to suppress and a motion to sever. They've 
both been briefed by both defense counsel and the 
prosecution. 
Mr. Snider, do you have a preference as to 
which motion we address first? 
MR. SNIDER: I don't, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: They are your motions. I'll allow 
you to proceed. 
MR. SNIDER: Thank you, Your Honor. First of 
1 all, Your Honor, I'll address the issue of the motion 
2 to sever the trials. The State argues that judicial 
3 economy is something that needs to take effect in this 
4 matter. They argue that there's no reason why the 
5' State should have to cay for two trials, but, then, 
5j there's no reason why the State should have to pay for 
7 , an appeal. 
8 ' What I'm afraid of in this case, Your 
9 Honor, and I think Mr. Bunderson is perfectly honest 
10. with the court, but he's attempting to take purely 
11, hearsay statements, that would otherwise be totally 
12 ! inadmissible against my client, and admit them into 
13! evidence at the time of the trial acainst the 
14 
15 
co-defendant. Well, you can't ask the jury to hear 
them in reaards to one defendant and not the other 
16 i de f endan t 
17 
13 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Mr. Bunderson states that under Rule 804 
he should be able to, even if we were to try this case 
separately, he should be able to use those statements 
against Mr. Dahlquist because I think, quote, Mr. 
Telford would be unavailable. Well, under Rule 304. 
and I've read it and memorized it and looked at it. 
the only portion I can see under Rule 804 that would 
allow Mr* Bunderson to even attempt to use those 
statements would be subsection five, other exceptions. 
11 auote from that. "A s t a t e m e n t not s o e c i f i c a l l v 
2 covered by any of the f o r e g o i n g e x c e p t i o n s but ha v i n g 
3 e q u i v a l e n t c i r c u m s t a n t i a l g u a r a n t e e s of 
4i t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s , if the court d e t e r m i n e s that A. the 
5. s t a t e m e n t is offered as e v i d e n c e of a m a t e r i a l f a c t . " 
Let's go down to C. "The g e n e r a l p u r p o s e s of these 
rules and the interes t of justice will best be served 
8' by the a d m i s s i o n of the s t a t e m e n t into e v i d e n c e . " 
9 i The imp o r t a n t thing that the court has to 
10 realize is that under Rule 804 the only time purely 
11 h e a r s a y s t a t e m e n t s can be admitted against a d e f e n d a n t 
i 
12 is. num b e r one if the d e c l a r a n t is u n a v a i l a b l e and 
i 
13 truly u n a v a i l a b l e . What the State is a t t e m p t i n g to do 
I 
14 i in this case is make M r . Te l f o r d u n a v a i l a b l e by trying 
i 
l 
15 j these cases t o g e t h e r . M r . T e l f o r d is going to turn 
16 around and invoke his Fifth Amendment right against 
17, self-incrimination and in doing so he's then 
18i unavailable. If thev were to sever the two cases and 
19 
20 
21 
2 2 
23 
24 
25 
try Mr. Telford first, then he is not unavailable. 
If the State wants to continue these two 
cases together or, in the alternative, they want to 
put Mr. Dahlquist. they're making Mr. Telford 
unavailable. They're denying him his right to a 
constitutional guarantee to cross-examine and confront 
the witness. What they're trying to do is say he's 
1 unavailable. Thev're m a k i n a him unavailable. Under 
2; Rule S 0 4 they cannot use those statements if the 
3 person who made the statements is unavailable. 
4 1 THE COURT: Let me ask you. counsel, in theory. 
i 
5! though, wouldn't there always be a Catch 2 2 situation 
i 
Si when you have multiple defendants? Someone is going 
7| to have to be tried first if they're severed, right. 
i 
3I which then creates the unavailability of the other 
i 
9! defendant? 
i 
i 
MR. SNIDER: Mv client has not made anv i u 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
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20 
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24 
25 
statements at all. period, to the police officers, or 
anything that implicates anybody. 
THE COURT: I'm not talking about the facts of 
this case, I'm just talking about that in theory isn't 
there always that potential? 
MR. SNIDER: That is true. One witness might be 
unavailable for the other. But in this case, Your 
Honor, the unavailability goes to the admissibility 
under Rule 804. Whether or not to sever the case is 
purely in the discretion of the court, but what Mr. 
Bunderson is trying to do is use hearsay statements 
that are totally inadmissible at all. There's no ifs. 
and or buts about it, they are inadmissible. Even 
under Rule 804 they're only admissible if they're 
trustworthy, which is a real question in this case. 
Mr. Telford has made 12 different 
2 . statements to different individuals. I would like to 
3 ask the court how they can have 12 totally different: 
4 i s t a t e m e n t s , and not only are t-hey different, but 
5' conflicting statements, and they're going to try and 
6 J prove that they're, quote, guaranteed trustworthy. 
i 
7| under Rule 304. They can't. They cannot use the 
8, statements at all. So by trying my client with Mr. 
9 i Telford. Mr. Bunderson is kind of like sneaking them 
10' in. I cannot call Mr. Telford to cross-examine him. 
11 I can't — there is no way that I can confront those 
12' s t a t e m e n t s . They are totally conflicting statements 
i 
13; and every single one of them implicates my client to 
14! some decree or other. 
15 The state has no evidence to put my client 
16 at the crime scene but for these statements. That's 
17i all they've got. I'm afraid that if we try these two 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
cases together the jury will take Mr. Dahlquist and 
implicate him in a crime simply by guilt by 
associati on. 
The court, in regards to severing the two 
trials, needs to take into consideration if it appears 
that -- I'm quoting from 77-35-9 of the Utah Code, 
subsection C. "if it appears that a defendant or the 
prosecution is prejudiced by a joinder of offenses or 
1 defendants in an indictment or information, or b v a 
2 joinder for trial together the court shall order an 
3 election of separate trials of separate counts, or 
4 grant a severance of defendants, or provide such other 
5 relief as justice requires. " There's no ifs. ands or 
6 buts there. 
i 
7 My client is truly prejudiced by crying 
81 the cwo cases together. I mean, there is no way 
9 otherwise to say that he's not being prejudiced. I 
10i Mi i n k the case law out there is that it is in the 
11, discretion of the court, and Mr. Sunderson pointed out 
12i that it is in the discretion of the court, that if 
13 
14 
15 
there's any doubt that my client would be prejudiced 
bv this vou are suooosed to wave it with Judicial 
economy. The cost of an appeal and the time involved 
16 i there is much greater than the severina of these two 
17| defendants for trial and letting Mr. Dahlquist proceed 
13 
19 
with his case on its merits by itself. 
THE COURT: Let me ask you, again, though, 
counsel. I understand the issues with regards to the 
rules of evidence. I'm having a hard time walking 
through what I see as perhaps a philosophical dilemma. 
That being, if T were to proceed as you propose and 
direct that Mr. Telford's trial go first and then your 
client, wouldn't Mr. Bouwhuis be fully entitled to at 
1 that point cry foul and say we want to call Dahlquist 
2 as a witness but now we can't because his trial 
3, hasn't occurred and therefore we're being severely 
4 ' prejudiced because our trial went first and we can't 
i 
5 assert that right and we can't call him as a witness 
I 
i 
6 j to help clear ourselves? Wouldn't he be able to mak< 
7 » the argument with equal force that you are making? 
8 MR. SNIDER: No. Your Honor, because my client 
9 i has made no statements to anvone at all. 
10 THE COURT: But if he testified ac trial, won'c 
11 that have a significant impact on the outcome? 
i 
i 
12 I MR. SNIDER: But the problem is. Your Honor, that 
13 j they're trying to take statements that cannot be used 
14| against my defendant and attempting to use them 
15 j against my client. By trying the cases together 
! 
16 they'll take Mr. Telford's statements, which are 
i 
17 , clearly admissible evidence against Mr. Telford. But 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
in using those statements against Mr. Telford, they'll 
automatically infiltrate and implicate my guy. 
If my guy were to be tried first, second 
or whenever, it makes no difference. He's made no 
statements. Granted, he would be unavailable to 
testify at Mr. Telford's trial. I think the court is 
trying to avoid the same problem that we came back in 
front of the court on a couple of months ago on in 
regards to — I can't re^.mber h.he name cf the case. 
MR. BUNDERSOM: State vs. Cabatutan. 
MR. SNIDER: Yes. But that's not what is 
happening here. This is not a situation where my 
client would be unavailable to testify in behalf of 
Mr. Telford. What we're arguing here is that if we 
don't sever these my client will be severely 
prejudiced by statements that would not be used 
against him. could not be used against him. 
In the alternative, I can't cross-examine 
Mr. Telford. If they are put on the stand and these 
statements are read in there's nothing I can do to 
discredit those statements. They are statements that 
not only implicate my guy, but say he did it and I 
watched him do it and the statements were made in an 
attempt to exonerate the person who made them and 
implicate my guy. 
Under State vs. Collins, Your Honor, and 
I've cited it in my brief, 612 P.2nd 275, I quote: 
"The trial court must, when defendants are charged 
jointly, weigh possible prejudice to any defendant 
with considerations of economy and practicalities of 
judicial administration. Doubts concerning prejudice 
should be resolved by the trial court in favor of a 
defendant." 
1 I don't think there's a doubt in the world 
2 that these statements are prejudicial against my 
3 client. We're not talking about my client being 
4 1 unavailable for Mr. Bouwhuis to call him as a witness. 
5 i That would happen, as the court has pointed out. in 
any case. But this is a very perculiar case because 
7 1 if thev're tried together those statements would 
j 
8 otherwise not be admissible against my client and 
9 1 therefore I'm not being prejudiced by having somebody i 
i 
' i 
10' call him as a witness. I'm being prejudiced by the t 
11 fact that statements have been made that I cannot 
i 
12 ! cross-examine on. Mr. Dahlauist. if these cases are 
13 tried together, will be denied his Constitutional 
14 I right to confront witnesses against him. 
15 | THE COURT: Mr. Bunderson. 
i 
16 . MR. BUNDERSON: Your Honor. Mr. Snider mentioned 
17 i the confrontation clause. That's something that I 
18 don't recall he raised earlier in his brief. Let me 
19 j address that first rather quickly. The United States 
20 1 Supreme Court, in Idaho vs. Wright, ruled that the 
21 confrontation clause in the United States 
22 Constitution, and as it is interpreted throughout the 
23 country in state constitutions, historically arises 
24 from and in the context of and related to the hearsay 
2 5 rule. 
In Idaho vs. Wriaht what thev ruled was 
2 • that firmly rooted exceptions to the hearsay rule are 
3 also exceptions to the confrontation rule. I dealt 
4 i with this and it was handled ana briefed in State vs. 
5 | Stanley Smith. I can provide that brief to the court. 
i 
6! In the Idaho case. I didn't address that in mv brief 
7 j because it wasn't raised by counsel except for the 
i 
3 j first time today. 
9 ! In that case though, two of the more 
10! firmly rooted exceptions were determined to be the 
lli statements made by a person as they were perceiving or 
12! immediatelv foliowina an excitina event. We call it 
± J> 
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the excited utterance exception. There was one other 
exception and I believe that had to do with medical 
statements, statements of medical history. Those two 
were determined to be firmly rooted exceptions under 
the hearsay rule and therefore did not violate the 
confrontation clause of the Constitution by being 
admi t ted. 
In other words, we look at the 
confrontation clause and we think that the witness 
must be there because it says there has to be a 
confrontation. That's not what the law is. A number 
of hearsay exceptions are allowed. 
The hearsay exception I'm dealing with 
1i here has nothing to do with subsection five of Rule 
2 , 304. I didn't quote subsection five. I quoted 
3 | subsection three, which says that if a person is 
4 | unavailable, then we can use statements made by that 
j 
5| person at an earlier time, which would otherwise be 
6 J hearsay, if they are admissions against interest. 
i i 
7 j Admissions against interest are, I would submit, one 
i 
8 i of the firmly rooted exceptions to the hearsay rule. 
9 j That's what I've raised in my brief. I've said 
10 | nothing about subsection five, although subsection 
11 i five would be a fall back. 
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Here is the scenario that I see played 
out. If we try these two cases together and if the 
statements come in at trial, because they were 
statements made by Mr. Telford and they are admissions 
against interest and they are the admissions of a 
party, then Mr. Snider and Mr. Dahlquist can get a 
cautionary instruction from the court that says, jury, 
you are to ignore these statements regarding Mr. 
Dahlquist. 
If we separate the trials, then at 
Dahlquist's trial, under 8 0 4 ( b ) ( 3 ) , I submit that I 
would be able to get them in because Mr. Telford would 
be unavailable. Mr. Telford would either be awaiting 
his trial or he would have been tried and, if 
II convicted would be awaiting appeal, perhaps, or he 
2 J may choose to say nothing at all but would be 
3 unavailable in any event. Then I could get them in 
4 | and there would be no cautionarv instruction because 
there would be no basis for a cautionary instruction 
So Mr. Snider is in effect right, that 
when those statements come in at a separate trial of 
Mr. Dahlquist they'll just come in and the jury will 
hear them and they'll not receive a cautionarv 
10 1 instruction. If we did not separate the trials, had 
11, them toaether. thev would receive a cautionarv 
12 
13 
14 
15 
instruction. 
Actually, holding the trials together is 
better for Mr. Dahlquist. from the standpoint of the 
use of these statements, because the iurv at least 
16I would get a cautionary instruction. Otherwise, they 
17 
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would not be — Mr. Dahlquist would not be entitled to 
a cautionary instruction. That's the scenario I 
layout in my brief. 
There's nothing atypical about this 
situation. People commit crimes together all the time 
and they are tried together all the time. They always 
say I didn't do it. I was there but I only watched 
it. I didn't do it, but I heard about it. I didn't 
do it. but Dahlquist told me about it. That's all 
1 we've aot here. A routine, run of the mill, two 
2 defendant trial. Your Honor. And routinely, 
3 routinely, courts through out the country and in this 
4 , state have said use a cautionary instruction. Solve 
5 it that way and let's get on with it. 
6 \ In the Cabututan case I objected to 
i " 
! 
7 I statements and we wound up with not a reversal, but 
8, having to review something that went up on appeal 
9 I b e c a u s e the c a s e s w e r e s e v e r e d . If they h a d n ' t b e e n 
10 s e v e r e d t h a t i s s u e n e v e r w o u l d h a v e come U D . 
11 
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I would submit that under the 
circumstances, silly as it may seem because of the 
argument I'm presenting, what I am urging, that the 
court deal with this in a manner that helps Mr. 
Dahlquist rather than hurts him. It is better for him 
to have a joint trial. 
The other evidence against Mr. Dahlquist 
is this, Your Honor, and there is a mass of other 
evidence, beginning with his own statement that 
counsel has made a motion to supress. He did make a 
statement. Your Honor. He did say "I picked up Troy 
Weston that morning." That's what Troy Weston's 
parents say. That's what Travis Telford's sister 
says. She saw them on the way to the killing ground. 
MR. SNIDER: Your Honor, I object. That is not 
even close to a reflection of the evidence. That's 
not an accurate or even close facsimile of what Ms. 
Colantonio testified to at the preliminary hearing. 
MR. 3UNDER SON: She testified that she saw 
Telford and Dahlquist and Mr. Weston, with Mr. Weston 
in the back seat of Dahlquist' s Blazer. 
MR. SNIDER: No. She testified that she saw 
somebody wearing a cowboy hat and a long coat. 
THE COURT: That's not the issue in dispute on 
this motion in any event. 
MR. BUNDERSON: Well, according to Mr. Snider 
there's absolutely no evidence other than these 
statements. That's what we're doing is trying to show 
that there is other evidence. I've got a person at 
the scene who saw the Blazer, a Blazer, with three 
people in it, a small person in the back seat. Mr. 
Weston is small and slight. He saw that the driver 
had what he described as a beard. We have a 
photograph of Mr. Dahlquist with a straggly two or 
three day beard taken immediately after the incident, 
or shortly after the incident. 
We have a Chips Ahoy cookie box set up as 
a target. 
MR. SNIDER: This is totally irrelevant to the 
issue. 
MR. 3UIIDERSCII: It is not at all irrelevant. The 
2 issue has been raised that there is absolutely no 
3 evidence, other than Mr. Telford's statements, to tie 
4 I Mr. Dahlquist to this killing. The court needs to 
5| hear that there's a mountain of other evidence. 
THE COURT: I'll allow you to proceed. You may 
i 
7 | respond after-
8. MR. BUNDERSON: There's a Chips Ahoy cookie box 
91 found at the scene and set up as a target with three 
10 • or four other items. There aren't any holes in the 
11 cookie box. or any of the other targets, because. 
i 
1 2 | unfortunately. Mr. Weston was the target, although he 
i 
131 didn't know it at the time, apoarently. 
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That cookie box has Telford's fingerprints 
on it, has Dahlquist's fingerprints on it., and the lid 
had been ripped off. The lid to the cookie box was 
found in Mr. Dahlquist's Blazer two or three days 
later., three or four days later, and matched up. That 
lid came from that cookie book that was at the scene 
and had his fingerprints on it. 
We have a witness that will testify that a 
week or two before the incident Telford and Dahlquist, 
together, beat up Mr. Weston at a party in Weber 
County. We've got a witness who will testify that 
within an hour or two after the time of the killing, 
as well as we can fix, Telford and Dahlauist. 
2 1 together, in Dahlquist's Viazer . came ^ o his house and 
31 arranged to have the Blazer painted a different color. 
4i Thev were coaechcr then. 
Now. if that's not other evidence that 
they were involved together in the killing, then I 
71 don't know what is. Your Honor. So Mr. Telford's 
8 
9 
10 
statements are in addition to a great deal of other 
evidence that directly implicates Mr. Dahlquist. 
As I say, this is a relative!'/ tvpical 
11 situation where two defendants are to some extent 
i 
12| pointing the finger at one another and there's nothing 
13| unusual at all about those hearsay statements coming 
14 in with a cautionary instruction. And actually the 
15 cautionary instruction is going to give the jury more 
16i reason to pause and think about Mr. Dahlquist's guilt 
than in a situation where we have a separate trial 
because then there will not be a cautionary 
instruction. They'll just come in, I submit, under 
804 ( b ) ( 3 ) . 
THE COURT: Let me ask one question of you, Mr. 
Bunderson. with regards to the logistics of a trial 
and the application of Rule 804. Are you suggesting 
that it won't be necessary to attempt to call Mr. 
Telford as a witness? 
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MR. BUNDERSON: I'll subnoena him as a witness. 
2 yes. I cannot image any scenario where he would 
3 testify, though. I assume he 'd be unavailable. 
4 would testify, then T can introduce all the statements 
5 anyway. 
6 j THE COURT: Mr. Snider. 
MR. SNIDER: Again. Your Honor, those statements 
8 i are only admissible against Mr. Telford, not against 
Si my client. Even under 8 0 4(b) ( 3) . the State must prove 
10 • that a "reasonable person in the declarant's position 
11 would not have made the statement unless believing it 
! 
1 2 , to be true." 
13 The court is familiar with Johnny Wade 
14 i Drawn, State vs. Drawn. In that case Your Honor, the 
15 | court goes into great d e t a i l . It's 791 P.2nd 890 
l 
16 i It's a Court of ApDeals case. 1990. They go into 
i 
17 j great detail about that the only time statements are 
18 J reliable as a statement against interest is, quote 
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"there's a sufficient indicia of reliability." In 
every statement that Mr. Telford has made since he was 
arrested there is no continuity or reliability at all 
in anv one of them. 
In that court case the Court of Appeals 
said that hearsay statements of the witness are 
admissible at trial provided the State can show the 
1 witness unavailable and prove that the statement bears 
2 ' an adequate indicia of reliability. They quote Chio 
3 vs. Roberts, State vs. Chapman. State vs. Brooks. Mr. 
4' Bunder son is assuming that under Rule 304 the 
5 J statements would be admissible against Mr. Dahlquist 
i 
6 i anvwav. Thev're not. There is no reliabilitv at all. 
i 
i 
7 j The court goes on and says "a declarant is 
I 
8 | not unavailable as a witness if his exemption. 
91 refusal, claim of lack of memory, inability, or 
1C absence is due to the procurement or wrongdoing of the 
i 
i 11 ; proponent of his statement for the purposes of 
! 
i 
12 j preventing the witness from attending or testifying." 
13 i That's exactly what Mr. Bunderson is doing 
14 | here. He is attempting to call Mr. Telford in this 
15 j case to make him unavailable and then to turn around 16 and. under Rule 804. introduce those statements. 
17 I Under Rule 804 he's making the client unavailable. 
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He's making Mr. Telford unavailable to use those 
statements. He can't do that. You can't allow him to 
take 804 and subvert the U.S. Constitution with it. 
You can't do that. 
In that case, again. Your Honor, it talks 
in very great detail about trustworthiness and 
reliability. There has to be other substantiating 
witnesses; there has to be something that the 
statements which the person made was * statement 
against: interest. 
In the Drawn case it was a co-defendant 
who was a driver of a car involved in an armed 
robbery. Shortly after the robbery a good friend of 
mine, police officer Corey Nuble, pulls over two black 
females who turn around and confess that they were the 
drivers of the car, the car in the armed robbery. 
That was a statement against interest. It in no way, 
shape or form attempted to inculpate the defendant and 
exculpate the declarant, because if thai: were the case 
it would, quote, lack trustworthiness. 
Every single one of Mr. Telford's 
statements, every single one of them, attempts to 
inculpate the defendant and exculpate the declarant. 
What Mr. Telford has done the entire time he's been 
incarcerated is exactly what he told his sister 
before. He said. I'm not worried about going down on 
this case. I'm going to have Brandon take the fall. 
Every single one of his statements attempts to 
minimize what he was involved in. He says, I didn't 
pull the trigger, I didn't know anything about it. 
His whole entire defense is based upon the fact that 
he did it. 
This is not a typical case. It's not a he 
1 did it. 7ou did it tvpe thina. Mv iefense is based 
2 solely en the fact that Mr. D a h l q u i s : wasn't even 
3 there. You can't take 3 04 and attoT.pt to stuff these 
4 things in front of the jury and say. by the way. in 
5 | regards to this nice young man over here, disregard 
5 I it. but use it to convict this guy over here. You 
7 can't do that. A jury can't think that way. If this 
3 were a bench trial, maybe we could do that. 
9 You can't turn around and say that the 
10 co-defendant, who makes all of these statements in an 
! 
11 ' effort to free himself — and in fact the first 
i 
12 statement Mr. Telford writes to Mr. Dahlquist is that 
13 | he's going to tell the police that Brandon did the 
I 
14 I shooting. He says, "I hope you get the death penalty 
15 i and I would like to speak the euloay. I'd love to be 
I 
i 
16< s pallbearer." Those are the statements that the 
! 
17 1 State is going to attempt to say is inculpating both 
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parties? No. It is clear that it is exculpating 
statements made to inculpate my client. Under Rule 
804 they are not admissible. 
Mr. Bunderson can't argue, well, maybe 
under 804 they'll come in and for that reason we need 
to try this case together. The statements are at very 
best not admissible under Rule 804, but if there's any 
chance that my client would be prejudiced as a result 
of those statements coming in the court has to sever 
the trials. The case law is there for that. I don't 
see how the court can see otherwise. 
MR. BUNDBRSOW: As to whether they're exculpator 
or inculpatory, frankly they place Mr. Telford at the 
scene of the murder. They place him in a position 
where he and Dahlquist picked up Mr. Weston the 
morning he was killed and drove him to the scene cf 
the murder. And one of them says this: "I'm sorry 
s. but I have a very guilty 
1 take the wrap for destroying the 
did to Troy was very cold, hearties 
bullet to the head would have 
ed to kill him. I don't understand 
d around and started firing rounds 
ct that he'll take the rap for the 
n against interest. The fact that 
involved in it. that he helped pick 
ssion against interest. All of 
ns against interest. They're all 
ptions to the hearsay rule and 
ible under 804(b) ( 3) . 
d still emphasize that it's Mr. 
get a fairer trial, assuming those 
that I'm doing thi 
conscience. I wil 
gun, but what you 
and ruthless. One 
worked if you want 
why you just turne 
into Troy." 
The f a 
gun is an admissio 
he was there, was 
him up, is an admi 
those are admissio 
firmly rooted exce 
they're all admiss 
I woul 
Dahlquist who will 
1 statements come in. at a i o i n t trial than he would in 
2 his own separate trial. At least at the joint trial 
3 the jury would get the cautionary instructions. They 
4 i won't get those if Mr. Telford is called, declines to 
5 1 testify, becomes unavailable and then I can admit all 
I 
6 ! of his statements. 
7 ' THE COURT: The court will rule as follows on 
3 this issue. I'm not making any ruling today as to 
! 
9 1 what evidence will actually come in at the trial. I 
1 0 ! think counsel ail understand that. That will be ruled 
i 
i 
i 
111 UDon during the course of the trial. i * 
i 
12 | I am persuaded, however, that under Rule 
i 
1 3 ' 804 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, that the 
14 
15 
circumstances may well arise where the declarant, Mr 
Telford, is unavailable as a witness within the 
meaning of that rule. Therefore, pursuant to 
17 i subsection three, certain statements would be 
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admissible in evidence which would otherwise be 
hears ay . 
Looking at 8 0 4 ( b ) ( 3 ) . "A statement which 
was at the time of its making so far contrary to the 
declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so 
far tended to subject the declarant to civil or 
criminal liability, or to render invalid a claim by 
the declarant against another, that a reasonable 
oerson in the declarant's oosition would not have ^ad* 
2 the statement unless believing it to be true." 
3 For those reasons, I'll deny the notion to 
4 sever. I do tend to agree with the prosecution's 
5 position. It seems to the court that: a cautionary 
6 I instruction in a joint trial provides more cover, so 
! 
7 I to speak, for Mr. Dahlquist, than if the trials are 
3 separated, because in that case, in the court's view 
9 of that rule, it would be entirely inappropriate to 
10 have any type of cautionary instruction. So for that 
11 reason I'm going to direct the trials to proceed next 
12 ' Monday morning. 
13 Let's ao to the other motion, which is the 
14 ' motion to suppress. 
15 i MR. SNIDER: What we're looking at here is a 
i 
16 statement, and this is — the reason I want to exclude 
I 
17 j the statement from the defendant in the copy of the 
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interview between the police officers and Mr. 
Dahlquist. is that the police officer sits down and 
says we're at the Box Elder County sheriff's office. 
This is Brandon Dahlquist. Is that correct? Yes. 
What is your date of birth and he asks for Brandon's 
Social Security number. 
The first question out of the 
investigator's mouth in regards to any kind of 
1 intcrroaation at all is "Brandon, we're coina to visit 
2 with you on a couple of matters and before we do that 
3 I think we should advise you of your rights.'' The 
4, first words out of Brandon's mouth. "Yes, I would like 
5 1 a lawyer present." No ifs, ands or buts. He then 
6 i proceeds to say that he'd like a lawyer present five 
7 times in that interview. The police officer continues 
S to advise him of his Miranda rights. There's no 
3 reason to continue any kind of attempt to interrogate. 
10 There's no reason to do anything. 
11' What we have here is an officer saying 
12 maybe I can convince him to change his mind. He asked 
13, for an attorney. It's now just a typical I want to 
i 
14 | invoke my Miranda rights. He specifically says I want 
j 
15i an attorney. I want an attorney. He says that 
16 several times. Then the officer reads him his Miranda 
1 7 , rights. Mr. Dahlquist is saying I'll talk to you with 
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a lawyer present. The officer says. "Would you just 
sign that for me right h e r e . " So Brandon gets ready 
to sign the document, which says I was read my Miranda 
rights and I understand them. 
Then he says. "What am I being questioned 
about?" That's all he says. "What am I being 
questioned about?" The court needs to understand that 
Mr. Dahlquist was a primary suspect in a bad checks 
1 case out of Weber Countv at the exact same time he was 
2 being questioned by these police officers. Brandon 
3 • already had an attorney in Weber County on those bad 
4, check charges. 
5, He needed to know what he was beina 
6 j questioned about because if it were anything other 
7 i than those bad checks, then he needed to get another 
8" attorney. If he was being questioned about other bad 
Si checks, then he automatically had Mr. Steven Laker as 
10 his attorney and would have called him and had him 
11 present before any questioning. 
12 The only thina he says is, "What am I 
13 being questioned about?" It's a very specific, short 
14 I little question. Tt requires a very short answer. 
15 j You are being questioned about the death of Troy 
i " 
i 
16 Weston. That's a ] 1 it reauired. 
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The officer is very good. He says, "We 
wanted to discuss the situation with you about Troy 
Weston. You probably already know that he is 
deceased." Brandon says, "Yes, I know. I don't know 
anything about that." That's all he says. 
Then Dale Ward continues on and starts to 
interrogate him by confronting him with other 
evidence. "That's what he wanted to question you 
about, but you've invoked your lawyer privilege so we 
can't ask anv Questions, but — " Brandon at thai: 
2 ' point says "to be on the safe side." Then Dale goes 
3^ on. "-- but I would like to advise you of a couple of 
i 
4 i things. One of the things that I need to advise you 
I 
5| of," and isn't at this point supposed to advise him of 
i 
anything. He's invoked his right to an attorney and 
Mr. Ward is going on and interrogating Mr. Dahlquist 
3 1 here, j 
9! Mr. Bunderson will come in and argue that 
10! what we've got in this case is an unequivocal waiver 
11; of his Miranda right because he initiated the 
I 
12 i auestionina aaain. Brandon did not initiate anythina. 
13 Brandon said I want an attornev five times. I want an 
14 [ attorney. T want an attorney. What am I being 
15 | questioned about? I need to talk to my attorney. 
16; Then Dale says you're being questioned about this and 
17j starts on this whole thing about confronting Brandon 
18 1 with the evidence that they have against him. 
19 The only statement that we're attempting 
20 to suppress, Your Honor, is the words "I picked him up 
21 that morning." That is all that we're trying to 
22 supress. It is clearly a statement that was made 
23 after Brandon invoked his right to counsel but was. not 
24 I given an opportunity do speak to any counsel. Again, 
25 he'd invoked his right to counsel and it's not like 
1 the officer didn't hear him. but went ahead and told 
2 him this stuff anyway in an attempt to elicit 
3 conversation and engage in further interrogation. It 
4 I was clearly a violation of Brandon's Miranda rights. 
I 
5 i The Slate's argument, Your Honor, is that 
6 I this is, quote, general discussion about the 
i 
7 j investigation, not just necessarily an inquiry- That 
i 
8; is not true. This is a very specific inquiry. What 
9! am I being questioned about, because I have to talk to 
1 0 ' my attorney about what charges I'm being questioned 
i 
1 1 ; about. It required a very specific answer, not a 
12 ; general random answer. The officer answered that 
13 i question and then continued to interrogate him 
14 I further. There's no ifs, ands or buts about that] 
j 
15 j This is a statement made after invocation of Miranda 
j 
16 I and before Mr. Dahlquist was given an opportunity to 
i 
j 
17 j talk to an attorney. 
18 MR. BUNDERSON: Your Honor, I covered this in my 
19 j response. One thing that needs to be set as a ground 
20 rule, if you will, is on page two of my response. In 
21 quoting Oregon v s . Bradshaw and Edwards vs. Arizona, 
22 two United States Supreme Court cases, we find that, 
23 I one, the waiver must be voluntary* That is, the 
24 suspect must himself initiate the conversation that 
25 leads to the reinterrogation . We'll get to that in a 
moment. Number two. the waiver muse constitute a 
knowing and intelligent relinquishment of a known 
right under the totality of the circumstances. 
Does the court have any problem at all in 
making a factual finding that Mr. Dahlquist knew what 
i he was doing and was not under the influence of drugs 
or alcohol to the point he didn't understand and that 
1
 he was in a situation where he knew what was going on, 
knew what his rights were? It seems to me that the 
transcript i t s d f indicates that. 
Mr. Snider has added even further to that 
today by pointing out that Mr. Dahlquist had another 
charge pending, so the question had to do with which 
charge is this, more or less. I'm prepared to put on 
evidence that Mr. Dahlquist was not under the 
influence of any drugs, that he knew what he was 
doing, that he understood everything and that whatever 
he did was knowing and intelligent. Now, if we have a 
problem with that that as a factual basis, the factual 
background that must be laid, then I'm prepared to 
call Dale Ward to testify to those factors. 
But. again, I submit, based on what Mr. 
Snider has added to what is already in the statement, 
it is obvious Mr. Dahlquist knew what he was doing. 
He asked for a lawyer. He said I don't want to talk 
and asked for a lawyer again. But you do have to make 
that fact finding. Counsel, do you have any problem 
with stipulating to that for purposes of the argument? 
MR. SNIDER: Actually. Your Honor, Mr. Dahiquist 
has indicated that he was under the influence of a 
drug at the time that he was being questioned. 
THE COURT: That is certainly not in the evidence 
at this point. I'll allow both sides to present 
evidence on that issue if we have a dispute on it. 
MR. SNIDER: I think the big question is not 
whether or not it was made knowingly or unknowingly. 
The point I'm bringing up is that it was not a 
voluntary waiver. The officers initiated the 
interrogation after he invoked his Miranda right. 
MR. BUNDERSON: No, no. 
THE COURT: Let me interject at this point. I 
have reviewed the memorandum submitted by both 
parties, by both the prosecution and the defense. 
I've reviewed the transcript numerous times, because 
it is only two pages in length. As I recall in 
looking at one of the opinions I reviewed, the issues 
aren't always that clear cut. I recall reading a 
five to four decision which lends some credibility to 
either position. 
I am prepared at this point to rule that 
I 
I 
I 
! 
1 it appears to the court, from having reviewed that J 
~ transcript, that step one has been satisfied in this I 
3 sense: I recognize very clearly that the defendant 
4 was aware of his right to counsel. He asserted it 
5 | multiple times. I also recognize that his question 
i 
! 
6 i concerning what he's being questioned about was not 
i 
7 ! elicited or induced in any manner by the interrogating 
3 j officers. It was a completely voluntary statement or 
9 ! inquiry by him. He hadn't been setup to make that 
10' type of inquiry. So I think that was a voluntary 
11 statement which initiated the conversation. 
12 Whether at that ooint the waiver was a j 
i 
13 knowing and intelligent relinquishment, I'm prepared 
14| to hear evidence on that if counsel desire. When you 
15> say knowing and intelligent, I think it is obvious 
! 
16, that anytime someone says something that is against 7 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
eir in er st, y u can turn arou d and argue that's 
not very intelligent. I don't think that's what the 
criteria are under the cases. If it was not knowing 
or intelligent because of circumstances existing at 
the time of the interrogation, that may require some 
evidenc e . 
MR. BUNDERSON: I submit knowing and intelligent 
goes to the same as voluntary. That is, he was 
mentally capable of understanding what was going on 
1 and understanding his rights and knowing that these 
2 were two policemen talking to him and not his mother 
3 and father for example. Basically, he was capable of 
4 understanding where he was and what he was about and 
! 
5* who thev were and to him thev were the bad guys, if 
i 
i 
6 j you will. I submit the transcript shows all that. 
7 | Maybe the court has already made that 
j 
3 | finding. I'm prepared to put on some testimony that 
9 i it certainly wasn't apparent to either of the officers 
10* that he was anything but in complete control of his 
lli faculties. If that's the case. then, and I would 
i 
12 submit that the court has already made that finding. 
i 
13 but I can put on some additional testimony to support 
14 ' it . 
15 I The issue, then, becomes one of 
i 
i 
16 i initiation. If the person understands what they're 
I 
17 j doing and what is going on, then all that is -- all 
18 ! that the inquiry focuses upon, if you will, after that 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
threshold issue, is whether or not there was an 
initiation of further conversation. That is exactly 
what happened here. 
The case that I quoted, Bradshaw. an 
individual had been found dead in his wrecked pickup 
truck. The defendant Bradshaw was questioned at the 
police station and advised of his Miranda rights and 
1 was under arrest. He was advised of his rights, he 
2 denied his involvement and asked for an attorney. Up 
3 to that point that's what has happened in this case, 
4 ; Brandon asking for a lawyer. 
5; Mr. Bradshaw says I want a lawyer. The 
Si Miranda rights is done and he says I want a lawyer and 
7 ' that's the end of it. Then Mr. Bradshaw, as he was 
S1 being transferred from the police station to a jail, 
5 inquired of the police officer, well, what is going to 
10 | happen to me now. The officer then launched into a 
11' discussion concerning where the defendant was being 
12 ! taken and the charcres which would be filed, which 
13 
14 
15 
ultimately led, as the conversation went on, to Mr. 
Bradshaw admitting some incriminatory things. 
Now, in this particular case we have a 
16 i situation where the question is even less oblique than 
17| in Bradshaw. In Bradshaw the guy being taken 
13 somewhere by a jailer says what is going to happen to 
19 me now. That could have been interpreted any one of a 
20 I number of ways. What jail am I going to, are you 
21 I going to fingerprint me, any one of a number of things 
22; like that. But Mr. Dahlquist focuses directly on what 
23j is going on and initiates a conversation regarding 
24 J this particular incident by saying "what am I being 
25 questioned about." That's even more precise than the 
Brads haw case. It is even mere a compelling 
initiation of additional conversation than in the 
Bradshaw case. 
,nd is not a matter of the coliceman 
having to answer that question and then can't say 
anything else. The focus is on who initiated further 
conversation about the subject. Mr. Dahlquist did 
exactly that by saying what am I being questioned 
about. The officer goes on from there and doesn't ask 
him anything. As a matter of fact. I submit that at 
that point, when Mr. Dahlquist said what am I being 
questioned about, thy officers could have begun to 
interrogate him. That's what happened in Bradshaw. 
That's what is allowed under Bradshaw. additional 
interrogation so long as it is initiated by the 
defendant. 
In this particular case there was not even 
an interrogation. There was an initiation of 
additional conversation. Officer Ward told him a 
couple of facts and that's it. Officer Ward did not 
say did you pick up Troy Weston that morning. He did 
not say where were you the morning of March 12th. He 
did not say what were you doing. He did not say did 
you kill him. He did not say where is the gun. He 
did not even interrogate. He just said, in response 
1 to the question, that's what this is about. Mr. 
2 Dahlquist then volunteers fhe statement "I picked him 
3 up that morning." So we have an initiation of further 
4 , conversation and then a voluntary statement by Mr. 
5 Dahlquist under circumstances where he knew his 
i 
6 I rights. Mow. under Miranda, under the United States 
I 
7 J Supreme Court interpretations of Miranda, that is an 
i 
8 j admissible statement. 
9 THE COURT: Do the parties desire to put on any 
10 evidence on the second issue? 
l l 1 MR. SNIDER: As far as voluntary? 
1 2 , THE COURT: As far as the issue of knowing and 
13i intelligent. The first issue, the court has 
14 concluded, is that it was voluntary. 
15 MR. SNIDER: No. Your Honor. We'll subit it as 
16 | far as that. 
17 MR. BUNDERSON: Does Your Honor feel there's 
18 enough evidence to make a adequate finding on that 
19 situation, based on the transcript? 
20 | THE COURT: I do. However. I'll willing to 
21 certainly allow either counsel to call any of the 
22 witnesses that they desire. I note that there are a 
23 number of witnesses here in the courtroom. 
24 MR. BUNDERSON: Let me just call Dale Ward, 
25 DALE WARD, 
1 called as a witness, being first duly sworn to tell 
2 the truth, was examined and testified as follows: 
3 . DIRECT EXAMINATION 
4 ! BY MR. BUNDERSON: 
Q• Your name is Dale Ward and you are a 
detective with the Box Elder County sheriff's office 
is that all correct? 
A. Yes, sir. 
C ! 0. And there's a statement attached to the 
10 ! defendant Dahlauist's motion to suooress that we've 
I 
! 
11 i been discuss ina for the: last 20 minutes or so. Are 
I 2 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
you familiar with that statement? 
A• Yes, sir, I am. 
0 . And there's a transcript attached. 
Apparently the transcript was made from a tape 
recording of the actual verbal statement, is that 
correct? 
A. Yes, sir. 
0. And there is a conversation related in the 
transcript between Brandon and Dale. Is Brandon 
Brandon Dahlquist? 
A. Correct. 
Q • And is Dale, Dale Ward, you? 
A. Yes. 
O. And was Officer Jim Summerill also with you 
at the time? 
A. Yes. he was 
4 ; wi 
5 i 
O i 
0. Have v 
ith the transcript? 
A. Yes. 
- *-*- rqne and compared it 
vou reviewed the uape 
g. And is the tra nscript accurate? 
A. Yes, sir. 
A n d j ust one other question or two beyond 
t the time in question, when you 
Dahlquist, and the situation 
tunity to 
11 I when this arose 
8 I Q • 
a! that. On the date a 
10 I were interviewing Mr 
did you have an oppor 
12 i observe Mr. Dahlquist? 
j 
ir, I did A. Yes, s 
Q . Did you ha 
for some peri 
A_ Yes, sir. 
O . 
iod of time? 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 to questions 
ility to understand things? 
A. Yes, sir. 
ve an opportunity to spea k with him 
And did you have a 
his eyes, his a 
actions, his motions. 
his ability to hear questions, 
n opportunity to watch his 
bility to respond 
his 
20 i ab: 
! 
21 1 
22 
23 
24 
25 
0 # And were you par ticularly 
watching for an 
ability to unders 
A. Yes, sir, I wo 
O And did he appear 
tand and know what was going on? 
uld say I w a s • 
to you to understand what 
1 v o u w e r <=• t ^  1. U n a h i x 
2 A . Y e s . sir., h e d 1 d . 
3 Q. And were his answers appropriate, that is, 
4 ! appropriate responses to your various questions? 
. .5 ! A. Y e s , sir* There was an immediate response 
6 ! a f t e r a q u e s t i o n . 
7 ' Q • Was his thought process consistent? 
3 ! A. Yes, sir. 
9 i Q. D i d he a p p e a r to y o u to be u n d e r the 
10 i n f l u e n c e of any a l c o h o l or d r u g or m i n d - a l t e r i n g 
1 1 . s u b s t a n c e of any kind t h a t y o u c o u l d see? 
1 2 : A. N o t h i n g that I c o u l d d e t e r m i n e from w h a t I 
13 | c o u l d o b s e r v e , n o . 
i 
j 
14 i Q. And w h e n you talk a b o u t o b s e r v i n g , I'm 
15 ! t a l k i n g a b o u t all of y o u r s e n s e s , s m e l l , h e a r i n g , y o u r 
16 • observations of him? 
17; A. That is correct. 
i ". 
18! Q . How long have you been a police officer? 
1 9 j A . C1 o s e t o 1 7 y e a r s . 
20 Q. And I assume you've interrogated or discussed 
21 ! t h i n g s w i t h h u n d r e d s , if n o t t h o u s a n d s , of p e o p l e 
22 under similar circumstances during that time? 
2 3 A.. Yes, sir. 
24 Q# And you are basing your observations that 
25 you've testified about here today on your experiences 
and your training as well as the actual physical 
observations of- Mr. Dahiquist that day, is that all 
correct? 
A . ies, sir 
MR. BUNDERSON believe that's all. Well 
excuse me 
0. (BY MR. BUNDERSON) In your opinion, Officer, 
did Mr. Dahiquist know where he was? 
A. Ye s , s i r . 
Q. And did he know what was going on? 
A. He understood what was happening, yes. 
0. And did his actions appear to be voluntary to 
you, his comments and his statements? 
A. Yes, sir. 
MR. BUNDERSON: Okay. Thank you. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. SNIDER: 
Q. Officer, were you involved in the actual 
arrest of Mr. Dahiquist? 
A. Yes, sir, 
Q. And where was he arrested? 
A. At the Hotel 6 in Ogden. 
Q. And why were you led to the Motel 6 in Ogden? 
A. Through statements from a previous interview. 
Q. A previous interview with who? 
A . Travis Telford 
2', 0. So Mr. Telford is the one that set Dahlquisi: 
3 ; up. then? 
4! A. I wouldn't call it being set up. 
5 ! Q. Did you actually go to the Motel 6 and arrest 
6 Mr. Dahlquist there? 
I 
I 
7 | A. I and several other officers, yes. 
8 i Q. Were you involved in the search of that room 
I 
Si after the arrest of Mr. Dahlquist? 
10 i A. Yes. sir, I was. 
i 
11 . Q . And did Mr. Dahlquist tell you how long he 'd 
12 i been in that room or did you check with anyone at the 
13 ( hotel to determine how long he'd been in that room? 
14! A. To the best of my recollection, Mr. Dahlquist 
15 ! did not tell us how long he'd been in that room, but 
j 
i 
16 i we had a orettv aood idea. 17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Q. B a s e d o n w h a t ? 
A. Discussions in the interview with Travis 
Telford and also from discussiond with the motel 
clerk, determining when that room was rented. 
Q. Did anyone ever tell you that that room had 
been used as a party room? When I say party, I'm 
talking about the consumption of illicit drugs type 
party room, prior to the arrest of Mr. Dahlquist? 
A. That was never indicated to us, know. 
1 O. During your search of that room did ycu find 
2 a cocaine pipe? 
3 A. I didn't find one, no. 
4 Q . Do you know whether or not anyone found a 
5i cocaine pipe in that room? 
6] A. Not to my knowledge. I don't know of one. 
i 
7 j Q. You said you talked with Mr. Dahlquist for a 
I 
8 | period of time. How long did you interrogate Brandon 
9 before you turned the tape on? 
101 A. Okay. The tape recorder was turned on 
11 ! immediatelv the mornina of the 15th. I believe it was, 
12 
13 
14 
15 
15 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Yes, the morning of the 15th the tape recorder was 
turned on. Mr. Dahlquist was transported to our jail 
facility by myself and Detective Summerill. There 
were some statements made by Mr. Dahlquist at that 
time, the time of that transport. 
Q. And did anything in those statements that he 
made to you indicate that he had just consumed 
cocaine, smoked cocaine? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Officer, how long have you been a detective? 
A. About five years here with the sheriff's 
office 
Q 
A 
When was the last time you worked the street' 
When was the last time I worked the street? 
O. Yes. 
2 H. rive y^ars ago. 
^ 0. When was the last tirne you took any kind of a 
•1 • training class or anything in regards to recognizing 
5! the effects of drugs on the human body, if at all? 
6 j A. Without going back and looking at my training 
7 ! records. I really couldn't tell you. 
1 
8 Q. More than five or six years ago? 
9! A. It has been more than five, I'm sure. 
10 Q• You said you thought that Brandon was acting 
11, voluntarily at the time. Can you give me a specific 
12 instance that made you believe he was acting 
13 
14 
voluntarily and knowing? Did he have slurred speech? 
A. No. sir, he had no slurred speach in my 
15 ' ooinion. 
17 
13 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Q . Did he have rapid speech? 
A. Not what I would consider rapid. He was 
j talking faster than what I talk. 
O. Did he seem to talk in inconsistent 
statements? For instance, he would say one thing and 
then go to a different subject and then back to the 
other subject, or did he continually talk about the 
s ame thing? 
A. I wouldn't stay his conversations were not 
focused on one point to another. I would say he was 
3 
4 
5 
6 
focused on exactly what was going on. 
0. Did you ever check his ryes his pupils? 
I looked at his eyes. 
0. Did you notice if they were pinpointed? 
A. They were reactive to light. 
Q . When you say reactive to light, where was he 
/ ! l n t e r v 
i u 
11 
e wed ? 
He came from a dark corridor into th< 
9 interview room that is connected with the iail 
And what did his eyes do? Were they small? 
His eyes went from a dilated position to a 
12 smaller position when he came into the brighter light. 
131 Q. To real small? 
141 A. Well, the pupils were reactive when he came 
15' walking into the room. They were reactive to the 
1 6 i 1ight. 
I 
17 j 0 . Officer, do you recall whether or not he had 
13| blood shot eyes? 
19| A. Yeah, I believe they were. I do believe that 
20 | they were blood shot. 
21 I Q. Is there anything in Mr. Dahlquist's behavior 
22| that would lead you to believe that he'd just recently 
23 
24 
25 
consumed cocaine? 
A. Nothing that I could determine, no. 
Q. Anything to lead you to believe that he had 
1 i suspects. It also applies to witnesses. 
2! Q. At the time you arrested 11 r. Dahlquist , was 
3 he a primary suspect in your investigation? 
4 J A. At the time we arrested him? 
5 Q . Yes. 
6 • A. No, sir. 
7! Q. Isn't one of the interviewing techniques that 
8 I vou've been taught is o confront the witness or the 
9 suspect or the person you are interrogating with bits 
10 ! and oieces of the truth to determine whether or not 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
they'll respond positively or negatively to those? 
A. Yeah, that's a technique. 
0. To tell them exactly what you already know 
and see how they respond? 
A. That's a technique, yes, sir. 
Q. Is that not exactly what you did in this 
situation, is to tell Mr. Dahlquist "we already know 
that" and to sit back and wait for his response? 
A. No ; sir. He asked a questioned and I 
answered i t. 
Q. T believe he asked you a question about what 
you wanted to talk to him about. 
MR. BUNDERSON: "What am I being questioned 
about"? 
0. (BY MR. SNIDER) Is that correct? 
fcs, sir. 
2 Q . And their response was? 
3' A. They wanted to discuss the situation with *ae 
4. about Troy W cston. Well, umm, you probably already 
5: know that he's deceased." 
6 Q . And his response was? 
i 
t 
7! A. Yes. T know, and I don't know anything about 
3 1 that. 
Si Q. Okay. That was a specific question and a 
10 specific answer and then you specifically told him you 
11 understood that you couldn't talk to him anymore 
12 . because he'd invoked his rights to an attorney, 
! 
13! correct? 
14 A. Yes, sir. 
15! Q. And you put "but" on the edged of that 
16 sentence, correct, and then confronted him with 
j 
17 | statements that you already knew remember true in an 
18 | effort to elicit statements made by Mr. Dahlquist to 
19 1 determine if he was going to answer them truthfully or 
20 not? 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
A. Well, the situation exists here that if you 
listen to the tape, you would understand that in this 
transcription here all of this is blended in with each 
other. It's not in separate little lines like you've 
got here. In other words, "to be on the safe side" 
was not just a statement in itself, it was blended in 
2 1 with the conversation that was going on. 
3 . Q. Okay. But you specifically answered his 
4| question and then you said "but" and you confronted 
5 
6 
I 
3 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
him with the truth that you knew, already knew, for 
wha t purpos e ? 
A. Part A and B of my statement right there, and 
the part that says "to be on the safe side" that 
Brandon said, was ail one statement. 
Q . Okay. But you didn't listen to my question. 
What I specifically want to know is where did you ask 
- - you didn't ask him anything. Why did you 
specifically tell him things that you knew were true? 
A. Because I was answering his question. 
0. That's not an answer to a question. You 
didn't ask a question. He asked you a question and 
you answered the question and then you fed him this 
other stuff. Is it not true that the reason why you 
did that is because you were using the technique you'd 
been taught? 
A. I suppose subconsciously that could be true. 
MR. SNIDER: Thank you. 
THE COURT: You didn't get a chance to finish. 
MR. SNIDER: I think he did. Subconsciously that 
was true . 
THE COURT: He added one of those familiar y<=s 
2 buts that we're now discussing. I'll allow him to 
3 c on t i nue . 
4 THE WITNESS: The point I was trying to put 
i 
5 I across was that from this transcript it's all laid out 
6 | here in nice little neat lines- On the tape all of 
7 | this is jumbled together. The question has been asked 
8 | what am I being questioned about and all of this is 
91 all jumbled together in conversation back and forth, 
10 one person interrupting another. That was what I was 
i 
i 
11 | trying to say. All of this was placed on this one 
I 
12 i line together. 
I 
13. Yes, I agree with you that subconsciously 
14 
15 
16 
maybe I did put that little ditty in there, but my 
intent was not to elicit a response. 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
17 I BY MR. BUNDERSON 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Q. Are you saying that your conscious objective 
was to simply answer the question? 
A. That's correct. 
MR. BUNDERSON: Thank you. 
MR. SNIDER: I have no other questions, Your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: Anything further? 
MR. BUNDERSON: No. 
I THE COURT: You may step down. 
2 | MR. BUNDERSON: 
3 have one other thina. 
I did 
4| Q. (BY MR. BUNDERSon) How long were you with 
! 
! 
5 Brandon Dahlquist that mornina of the 15th when this 
! 
6 | statement was taken? From the beginning of your 
7 ' contact with him to the time you terminated the 
i 
Si interview was how long? 
! 
I 
9 i A. Umm, I didn't make a note of the starting 
lOi time. The interview ended at 10:28 a.m. Just from 
i 
11 memory, because I know that we do have a note on it 
i 
! 
121 somewhere. I'm aoing to say less than five minutes. 13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
15th? 
0. Okay. Was Mr. Dahlquist in your jail? 
A. Yes , sir. 
Q . Had he been arrested sometime prior to the 
A. He'd been arrested either real late on the 
14th or very early the morning of the 15th. Again, 
don't know exactly. 
Q. And were you there when he was arrested? 
A. I was not in the room at the time the other 
officers were entering the room. I was outside the 
mo te1 . 
Q• Did you take custody of him upon his being 
arrested? 
That s correct, I did 
5 ! jail? 
And that was for an unrelated offense? 
There was an outstanding warrant, yes. 
And did you take him to the Box Elder County 
Yes, sir. 
7 i Q. Okay. And that would have been late on the 
3 ! 14th or early on the 15th? 
10 
A. That's correct. 
O. I assume we're talkina about sometime around 
11 midniaht? 
12 A. We're talkina somewhere between 11 and one 
13 o'clock in the morning, make two o'clock in the 
i 
! 
14 ! morning. 
15 I asked you a series of questions earlier 
16 - about Mr. Dahlquist's condition and your observations 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
of him. My questions went to the morning of the 15th 
when you were interviewing him. By incorporation of 
all of those same questions regarding his condition on 
the trip from Weber County where he was arrested, I 
believe that's where he was arrested? 
A. Corre c t . 
O. To Box Elder County. That takes about half 
an hour, I assume? 
A. That's correct. 
1 O . And were you there during the book-in 
21 process? 
3* A. Part of it. yes. 
4 I Q• So for that period of time did you make those 
i 
51 statements and observations of him? 
A. We observed him, yes. 
Q • Would your opinion be the same, that is, that 
he did not appear at that time to be under the 
influence of any drugs or substances of any kind? 
A- It's the same as what I testified to earlier. 
7 
i 
i 
i 
3 i 
S 
1 0 ' 
1 1 , 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
13 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
There was no gross things observed that would indicate 
influence, such as, again, as Mr. Snider brought up. 
No slurred speech, he seemed to be navigating okay as 
far as walking. His movements seemed okay. We seemed 
to be getting a response from the answers to the 
jailer's questions upon book-in, the responses seemed 
to be adequate. In other words, immediately after the 
question was the answer. 
Q . He was tracking and focusing? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. And that's ten or so hours before this 
interview, is that correct? 
A. That's a pretty good guess, yes. 
Q. And then he was in jail all the intervening 
time? 
A. That's correct 
3 ! 
4 ! 
5 !' 
I 
6 | 
i 
I 
7 I 
I 
MR. 3UNDERSON: That's all I have. 
MR. SNIDER: Nothing more, Yrfur Honor. 
THE COURT: You may step down. 
MR. BUNDERSON: Nothing further. 
THE COURT: Do both parties submit the matter? 
MR. SNIDER: I have a closing arguments, briefly 
3 Your Honor, I guess the reason why I'm so upset about 
9! this statement that was elicited in this case is 
10 because I too have gone to interrogation schools and 
11 these are classic interrogation techniques. Detective 
12' Ward is attempting to solicit statements from Brandon 
13 | by specifically baiting him and making him answer. 
14 i There was a specific question, what am I 
15 i being questioned about. There was a specific answer 
! 
16 i to it. Then there was a "but" and this whole line of 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
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25 
interrogation techniques that are used to trick 
defendants into making statements like this. That's 
what they are trained to do. 
What good are Miranda rights if a man 
specifically asks for a lawyer and it can then be 
waived simply because somebody uses techniques to 
force him to waive it. The proper training, Your 
Honor, for all police officers, is you get someone to 
invoke their right to an attorney. Bradshaw cites a 
specific example of that. He read his Miranda and 
invoked his right to an attorney. There was a period 
of time that transpired, an extended period of time, 
and then the defendant reinitiated conversation. This 
is not what happened here. This man asked for an 
attorney five t i m c s and he was never given an 
opportunity for the attorney? 
A. He'd been up all night long. There is 
suspicion as *- o whether or not he was under the 
influence. There was nothing to say that he was, 
nothing to say that he wasn't. It's my belief 
one of the items that was seized, and I'll pro 
this to the court. I can't find it in my file, 
the items seized at the time of his arrest was 
cocaine pipe in the hotel room. The man had h 
sleep for approximately 12 to 15 hours. He's 
some form of an illicit drug. He's being ques 
and then he's being interrogated using sublimi 
techniques to elicit statements from him. Tho 
the types of techniques that need to be suppre 
Miranda. 
MR. BUNDERSON: What good are Miranda rig 
They are good for the full employment of lawye 
courts, court clerks, and everyone else involv 
this system because it gives us games to play. 
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That's 
1 all we're doing here. That's all this whole Miranda 
2 thincr is about. 
And the rules of the game are set out in 
Bradshaw. One of the rules of the game is that if a 
5' defendant initiates further conversation, or further 
oi interrogation, then it is proper for it to occur. 
i 
! 
7 t That's the rule. Mr. Snider does not like it because 
8 it doesn't help his client. Mr. Snider tells us that 
9 I the defendant In ad no sleep. He'd had apparently ten 
10 hours of sleep. He'd been in the jail before the 
11 interrogation. 
i 
12 Mr. Snidpr tells us he'd taken drugs but 
13 j there is no evidence that he had. The only evidence 
14 | is that he was fine. He was tracking and was focused 
I 
15 The rule is, under those circumstances, that if the 
16 ! defendant initiates further conversation that that is 
! 
I 
17 ' the problem of the defendant. 
The officer was well trained. You can 
read that transcript. The officer did absolutely 
nothing improper. He played the game by the rules. 
That's what we would ask the court to do, too, is 
simply enforce the rule. 
THE COURT: The court finds as follows. Having 
reviewed the transcript and a somewhat cursory review 
of the authorities cited by the parties, the 
3 
4 
d e f e n d a n t , from the d e s c r i p t i o n s g i v e n by the 
t e s t i m o n y , a p p e a r e d to be coherent., a p p e a r e d to 
u n d e r s t a n d w h e r e he w a s . w h a t he was d o i n g , to be in 
c o n t r o l of h i s f a c u l t i e s . T h e r e was a d e s c r i p t i o n of 
5 | blood shot eyes, but that is subject to any number of 
i 
6 I i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s by i t s e l f . A l l of the o t h e r 
7 I i n d i c a t i o n s are that he w a s c o h e r e n t and u n d e r s t a n d i n g 
S I w h a t was g o i n g o n . 
9! The transcript seems to the court to 
10 j r e f l e c t t h a t the d e f e n d a n t a s s e r t e d h i s r i g h t to l e g a l 
11 j c o u n s e l . I f m l o o k i n g r i g h t at the top of w h a t is the 
i 
12; second page of the transcript at issue here. There 
13 
14 
15 
16 
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were then no further questions posed by the officer. 
However, the defendant initiated an inquiry regarding 
the case. I recognize that those responses can be 
described as inviting further discussion by the very 
nature of the response, but they were not questions. 
They are responses to the question which the defendant 
voluntarily initiated. 
It appears to the court that it was 
knowing and voluntary. One of the reasons I conclude 
that is that the defendant almost immediately 
recognized that I don't want to discuss this thing any 
further, I want my lawyer. The conversation is 
closed. That tells the court that this is not someone 
and 
- hnl or something = 1 ^ -
as or aicohol or 
v, , „ a r ? of his ci r c u m s t a n c e s 
nuch a war P ^ *• 
,,
 t o assert his 
3 f l o w i n g th. conversation and was - . 
„.d So I'll deny the motion „o 
n d in fact did. So 
r. •; c out on drug 
1 who is ouo 
, ,-n be very mi 
2 seemed ro o* 
A I right a 
5 I s u p p r e s s . 
6 
•
 Q 1 1 P S we can address this 
A n y other issues 
i A «=<- Your Honor . long 1is ^  r 
S 
9 
evening.' 
MR. BUNDERSON: I've a 
THE COURT: 
I tried to pose 
that question by 
10 1 noting the time. 
M R . BUNDEPSON: I unders 
; u 9 t r U n through what I have as a 
The court very 
other time. 
11 
I 
12 i L e t T,e 
I 
i 
13 1 issues 
14 1 arguments for an 
15 
tand that is a p r o b l e m , 
list of the 
fur ther 
well may n^ed to reset. 
T H E COURT 
X do have some t i l P 8 tomorrow 
but I 
t defense counsel. 
fine for tomorrow. 
16 i don't know abou' 
-, I MR. B O U W H U I S : I'm 
1 7
 A „ ^ 3 0 or 
rn the later a f t e r n o o n , 2.-3 
! mas rnilRT: * n t n e x 
18 
19 three 
20 MR. SNIDER: 
I have a 
trial scheduled tomorrow 
,1 but I f il e d a m° 
tion to continue base 
d upon the death 
22 | of my client's grandmother. 
I ha ve not got an answer 
.r t was 
~-,v-^ <5 to that 2 3 ! in regards <-u 
24 1 s 
25 
upposed to call my 
^^11 over there, 
THE COURT: We can call ov.r 
.: rrllit COU1 
The Logan circui 
n d l e t me know. 
but we may 
iffice ai 
not find anyone there now. 
MR. SNIDER: Other than that. I don't have any 
other time available this week. 
THE COURT: We can proceed this evening. If 
tomorrow afternoon we're all available I suspect we'd 
all be better served to take the time tomorrow 
afternoon. 
MR. BOUWHUIS: I have a .notion to suppress also. 
I imagine the court will want to hear something on 
that. We can do that tomorrow, since I'm available 
tomorrow. That doesn't necessarily involve Mr. 
Snider. We'd love to have him here, of course. 
MR. BUNDERSON: Let me just go through what I've 
got in my notes. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. BUNDERSON: I've invited counsel for some 
time now to review the entire file with me. I want to 
make sure that they have everything. We were planning 
on doing that this afternoon after we finished the 
arguments here. That offer is still available during 
regular business hours as can be arranged. It has 
been that way for a month or so. 
THE COURT: Let's clarify whether it is still 
regular business hours, 
MR. BUNDERSON: It is not now. Mr. Dahlquist has 
1 a previous conviction for forgery which I intend to 
2 bring up and a 11- «=» ?• p t to use =i t the t-rial if he 
3 testifies. T don't think that is a surprise to 
4 ! anyone. 
5 I Counsel have requested that we fingerprint 
some shell casings. That has been done. 
7 | MR. SNIDER: We haven't got the results on that. 
8 MR. BUNDERSON: They've been sent. The results 
9 are that there are — 
10 
11 
12 
THE COURT: Could vou be done in five minutes? 
MR. BUNDERSON: I can trv. 
THE COURT: Let's aive Rod a few minutes to 
13 | reload and rest for a moment, then we'll try and 
14 I address the other issues 
{ Short recess 
16 
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MR. BUNDERSON: Regarding fingerprints on the 
shell casings, they've been sent. There are some 
other issues involving shell casings, bullets. They 
have all been compared one with another and some 
unspent or unfired bullets were also compared. I 
think you have those results. If not, I know they're 
on the way. 
MR. SNIDER: We were faxed a copy of that today. 
MR. BUNDERSON: I have some jury instructions 
I've submitted. I don't know if there's any objection 
TRANSCRIPT 
TRIAL 
' A o r i 1 3 . 1 9 ? " 
THi CLERK: Case number 341-43, State of U c a L v 
Brandon Dahlquist, and ~ 4 1 - 4 4 , 3 t ate u f U t a h vs. 
Travis Ttlford. • 
THE COURT; This is the time set for trial. Is 
the prosecution ready to proceed? 
MR. BUNDERSON: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Are the defendants ready to proceed? 
MR. B 0 U W H UI 3 ; We ar e , Your Honor. 
M R . Y BNGICH; W i t h the raservacio n n revicusl y 
announced, Your Honor, we are ready to proceed. 
THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen., I'm Judge Ben 
Hadfield. I'll be presiding at this trial. I'll Le 
assisted this week by the clerks, Shauna Whitaker and 
Chris Jeppesen. Our court reporter is Rod Felshaw. 
We have two bailiffs. Curtis Hansen and Brett 
Ricketts. 
I'll ask the clerk at this time to draw 2 
names from the jury panel. Let me ask first, has the 
panel been sworn? 
THE CLERK: They have, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. If you'll draw those and 
allow a pause between each one so we can get all the 
names down. 
THE CLERK: Allena Ann Fierce; Ryan L. Rose: 
which was a question that I x i gh t h a ; c asked my s e 1 f , 
he did net s er e m to be a ngry in any aense,. nor did I 
n o t i c e h i in raise h i s voice 1 n a n y manner or shake h i s 
head. I would like the record to reflect that that, 
at least, was my observation. 
THE COURT: The record will so reflect. 
MR. SUNDER30IJ: To fellow that up, my observation 
was that I thought he was at least slightly offended 
by that exchange. The other t h i ng, Your Honor, Mr . 
Yengich either proffered or read to Mr. oouwhuis the 
fact that Grace W ilson read certain magazines. He 
listed the Salt Lake Tribune as b sing one that she 
read. The Salt Lake Tribune, Mews and Journal, Time 
and U.S. Today. My notes indicate that that was Paul 
Peterson, who was seated right next to Grace Wilson. 
THE COURT: ^ 11 /ight. Counsel, we'll hear fror; 
you now on other motions. We have to pick the pace 
up. We have a jury waiting to come out. I know 
there's other motions to address. 
MR. 3 0UWHUIS: Just before I get into the motion 
that I intended to address here, we do have a concern 
with Mr. Bunderson's box and the name on the front 
saying "Telquist" that is facing the jury. It seems 
to be somewhat of a subli m inal suggestion to the jury 
that these guys are together and tied in this. 
18 
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w e ' v e a t y u e d t h i b f o r ^ o m e t i ;•  e a n d y ca ' 11 lied. 
s o m c: ••;: o r e , is -u h a t f" u e s r- p *r o p 1 o are U r ; v r ( 1 r :"; 
individual trials ci n d i n c i v i d u a 1 j u d g m e n t s . ~ ^  a n s ,.: 1 
is o o i n o to ^ryue f'hdt with ;r.^ re viwor M O W . but w <-: 
join in the niotian for a m i s t r i a 1 . The idea is t h a t 
they get individual d e t e r m i n a t i o ns as t o t h e i r 
judgment. 
I'll accept what Mr. Sanderson has to say, 
that it's either laziness or a ~'oke that lie wrote it 
that wa v. but the Zact of th e .n alter ± S Liicl L C b t l i * 
has an impact on the jury and it has been sitting 
there and they'v e been looking at it up un t i1 n ow . 
THE COURT: The motion is denied on that. I will 
14 | direct, Mr. Bundarson, that the box not be placed on 
the table until the name is either corrected or 
removed. 
MR. 3UNDERSON: That's fine. 
MR. BOUWHUIS: Thank you, Your Honor. As the 
court is aware, there have been several motions made 
throughout the course of this case. I believe they've 
been made by counsel for the defendant Dahlquist. We 
have joined in those motions and we renew our motion 
at this time to sever the case. The reasons are many. 
Basically, the court should sever this 
case because the two defenses ?ire clearly antagonistic 
I agree with counsel on that point, if the court is 
2| inclined to grant it. I I think now we're ripe and 
3] able to do it at this point. 
4 But I submit it on the issue of whether 
5 that's fair to everyone involved and also would point 
6 out the problem with getting witnesses here in another 
7 six to eight months. 
8 MR. YENGICH: The issue isn't another six to 
9 eight months. The issue is whether or not the court 
10 will give us three hours to contact Jeff Butler of the 
11 Supreme Court and to indicate,, in written papers which 
12 can be easily typed, what we now feel to be the mature 
13 issue in this particular case. It is true that this 
14 was not visited before. The redacted statement issue 
15 was not argued before the Supreme Court. It was 
16 simply a matter of whether inconsistent defenses was 
17 something that they would take an interlocutory appeal 
18 on • 
19 Our court has indicated a willingness in 
20 the past to deal with issues, even during the course 
21 of a trial, which affect the fundamental rights of an 
22 individual. In this case all we're asking is an 
23 opportunity, and it can be done with a conference 
24 call, to see if Jeff Butler will arrange a conference 
25 call and all he needs is three justices for us to 
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Judy Spinden - D 
listen carefully to each witness as they testify. You 
have the ability to take notes and we would all 
request that you do that. I would call Judy Spinden. 
JUDY SPINDEN, 
called as a witness, being first duly sworn to tell 
the truth, was examined and testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. BUNDERSON: 
Q. How are you this morning? 
A. Fine, thanks. 
Q. Would you tell us your name and address? 
A. Judy Spinden. 3965 Raymond Avenue. That's 
in South Ogden, Utah. 
Q. Mrs. Spinden, I'll call your attention to the 
12th day of March, 1994. I'll ask if you had occasion 
on that day t- o be in the area south of Willard Bay, 
along the south dike? 
A . Ye s, I was. 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
that time? 
Okay. Who were you with? 
My husband. 
His name? 
Dee Spinden 
And what were you and your husband doing at 
We were going for a ride. 
Judy Spinden - D 
1 Q. All right. Is there a south dike — a south 
2 marina out there along that road? 
3 A- Yes. 
4 Q. Using that as a guidepost, if you will, did 
5 you and your husband drive past the south marina? 
6 A. No. 
7 Q. Okay. What did you do, then, out in that 
8 area ? 
9 I A. We were driving down the dirt road and we 
10 decided to pull over and let our dog cut. 
11 Q. Okay. About what time of day was this, can 
12 you tell us? 
13 A. It was about 2:20, 2:30, around in there. 
14 Q. Okay. And then did something unusual happen 
15 after you let the dog out, and if so describe what it 
16 wa s ? 
17 A. Well, I let him out and I had him on a leash. 
18 He started pulling me, which he does sometimes anyway. 
19 He pulled me toward this area and there was a little 
20 ditch down there and I could see a tennis shoe 
21 sticking up. Then, as my dog got me closer, I saw the 
22 body and I pulled him back, 
23 Q. Okay. Was your husband with you at this 
24 moment? 
25 A. No 
J u d y S p m d e n - D 
I f t h i s i s t h e r o a d w a y ? 
Y e s . 
A. Y e s . 
Q. Thank you. Did you 
within a few feet of the body 
at all? 
you say you approached 
Did you touch the body 
A. No, I didn't. 
0. Did either you or your husband move or remove 
anything from the scene? 
A. No, we di dn' t. 
Q. What did you do next? 
A. We got in the truck and we were trying to 
decide where to go first, how to report it. 
Q. What did you ultimately decide? 
A. We decided to go to his first cousin, Archie 
Smith, who is a Weber County deputy sheriff. We went 
to his home and told him. 
Q. Okay. Where is his home? 
A. Umm, on that same stretch of highway, on the 
old highway. 
Q. The one that runs if front of Smith and 
Edwards ? 
A. Right. 
Q. Not the turnoff to Willard Bay? 
A. Right. 
Archie Smith - D 
of that for about a block. Then it goes west again up 
towards the bay area. 
Q. Willard Bay? 
A . Yes . 
Q. So are you at the south end of Willard Bay, 
then, approximately? 
A. Umm, yeah, I believe that would be the south 
Q. Roughly how far from the dike, can you tell 
me that? 
A. Umm, I'm really not sure. 
Q. Okay. It's not right next to the dike? 
A. No, it's not . 
Q. Okay. What did you do when you arrived at 
the scene? 
A. Well, at first I didn't see the body. I 
mentioned -- we got out of our vehicles and I said 
where is the body. My cousin said right there and I 
kind of looked over and still couldn't see nothing. I 
looked again and then I saw one foot kind of sticking 
up out of the ditch area. 
Q. I'll show you what is marked as State's 
Exhibit 5. I'll ask if you can identify that? 
A. Yes, I can. 
Q. Is that the body as it appeared when you 
first arrived? 
Archie Smith - D 
Q. Did other officers then begin to arrive? 
A. Yes, I believe, after Deputy Anderson 
arrived, was Sergeant Art Haney. 
Q • From? 
A. The Weber County sheriff's office. Deputy 
Bob Johnson from the Weber County sheriff's office and 
then I believe two officers from Box Elder County 
arrived, including Sheriff Limb. 
Q. Are you familiar with Detective Summerill, 
seated here to my right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did he arrive at the scene also? 
A. I believe he did, yes, sir. 
Q. At some point in time did one of the deputies 
do what we call increase the crime scene perimeter, 
that is, move the tape a little farther back? 
A. Yes. That was Detective Eric Jones from the 
Weber County sheriff's office. He had also arrived at 
about the time the other officers did. I think he's 
the one that first started pointing out some of the 
other evidence and decided to increase the crime scene 
area . 
Q. What other evidence did he point out that you 
obs erved? 
A. That I observed was the shell casings in the 
I looked and sat in the iurors box uo here with the 
21 bailiffs. This juror's chair, this one here, which 
3 would be number 11 and 12, I can see Telquist again on 
4 the box. Mr. Bunderson then moved the box, but we 
5 would renew our motion for a mistrial on the basis 
6 that Telquist shows on the box. 
7 MR. BUNDERSON: I would point out that, 
8 particularly from that angle, any time the jury was in 
9| here Mr. Bouwhuis and Mr. Telford were seated between 
10 them and the box. I have moved the box further away, 
11 though . 
12 THE COURT: All right. I'll receive Defendants' 
13 Exhibit No. 44. That is, again, to be placed in a 
14 separate envelope and not to be reviewed by the jury. 
15 Excuse me. It's No. 40. 
16 I'll deny the motion with regards to the 
17 box. Mr. Bunderson, I'll ask that during the break 
18 you take steps to obliterate that name on the box and 
19 then the issue won't reoccur. 
20 MR. BUNDERSON: I suggest a cautionary 
21 instruction to the jury. 
22 THE COURT: I'll give you at least a ten minute 
23 recess at this time. Court will be in recess. 
24 THE BAILIFF: Court is in recess. 
25 (Afternoon recess.) 
uaj.c " a r a - u 
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ri. ies, sir, x was. 
Q. In connection with that Investigation, did 
you have occasion to have a conversation with the 
defendant Brandon Dahlquist? 
A 
Q 
Q 
A 
Q 
Yes, sir, I did. 
And when did that occur? 
On the 15th of March, 1994. 
And where did it occur? 
At the Box Elder County sheriff's office 
And it was a quite brief interview, as I 
understand it? 
A. Ye s, sir. 
Q. Just tell the jury what you asked or said and 
what Mr. Dahlquist said. 
A. T advised Mr. Dahlquist that we wanted to 
discuss a situation about Troy Weston. I asked him if 
he realized that Troy Weston was deceased. I also 
advised him at that time that on Saturday morning I 
knew he had picked up Troy Weston at his residence. 
He stated that he had in fact picked him up. 
MR. BUNDERSON: Thank you. That's all. 
MR. YENGICH: May I approach the witness, Your 
Honor? 
THE COURT: You may. 
David riaasen - D 
Tell ;•:; e and t h e jury what it was he told you 
on that day? 
MR i d i-4 ^ r x ^ n : Your Honor, our objection is under 
Rule 10 5, the rule that this comes into evidence only 
against Mr. Telford and not against the defendant 
Dahlquist. We would ask that the jury be admonished 
in that regard. 
THE COURT: I'll give t h <s jury the same 
instruction, remind them of the instruction I 
previously gave them, that any testimony that comes 
from — any statement made by one of the 
co-defendants,, when that co-defendant is not on the 
witness stand, is only applicable against the 
individual who made the statement. In this case, the 
witness is referring to a statement which is alleged 
to have been made by Mr. Telford. It may not be used 
in any manner against Mr- Dahlquist. 
MR. YENGICH: And so the record is clear, we 
renew all of the other objections that have been made. 
THE COURT: That is noted for the record. 
MR. YENGICH: Thank you. 
MR. BOUWHUIS: As do we, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: So noted. 
Q. (BY MR. 3UNDERSON) You can go ahead now. 
u a v1a aansen - J 
A . T will Just r e a d it so it will be easier LOT 
me to keep it straight. "On April 14th. "994, while 
enroute to Box raider County jail with prisoner Travis 
Telford, he told me about the day of the homicide of 
Troy Weston. Since his arrest he's attempted numerous 
6 I times to tell me of the incident. Each time lie's 
attempted to tell me I would inform him that he had 
3| secured an attorney and must have his permission to 
91 talk to me about the incident. 
10 I "About 4:15 while on 1-15 enroute to the 
jail, Travis, without being asked, started to talk 
about the homicide of Troy Weston. He said that Troy 
had inquired about buying a gun because he had some 
14 I people who wanted to hurt him. He said he went and 
picked up Troy Weston at his house and headed cut to 
j. o | W i 11 a r d t o s h o w h i m t h e g u n . 
171 "He said that when he and Troy arrived out 
18 in Wiliard out came a small automatic .22 caliber 
19 handgun. He said that they had parked on the side of 
20 the road to shoot. They then got out and went over to 
21 shoot the gun and Troy asked how did it work. Travis 
22 said that when Troy asked if it worked, he was shot in 
23 the shoulder. He said Troy screamed and said what are 
24 you doing. Troy then was shot again. This time twice 
25 in the back, because Troy's body had then shifted 
u d V 1 a K a n S c Ti ~ Si 
S i G c W a V S • 
"He !" h e n said Troy continued to yell c o 
stop it. He then said tha; one of the bullets ,;iusc 
have hit Troy's spine because he
 :uit living and just 
dropped to the ground. Troy was then shot again twice 
rii ore in the front and the gun jammed. He said it 
either jammed or ran OUT: of a mm un i z i en . Travis went 
back to the Blazer and got another clip. "when he got 
back to the rlazer the new clip was loaded and the gun 
was placed under Ttc/'s chin and the ""rigger pulled 
one last time. He then said Troy did not move any 
more and he dragged the body about 3C feet to fhe 
ditch. He then got back to the Blazer and sped back 
to Ogden . " 
MR. BUNDERSON: Thank you. Your Honor, I reserve 
the right to recall Detective Hansen regarding some 
other matters, but that's all I have at the moment. 
THE COURT: Cross-examination. 
MR. BOUWHUIS: Y e s . 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. BOUWHUIS: 
Q. Detective Hansen, could you tell us, at this 
time Travis had already been arrested on this charge, 
had he no t ? 
A. Y e s . 
approximately 15 minutes, depending somewhac on how 
2 long we take in our hearing before we take our recess. 
3 I'll advise the bailiff to escort the jury out at this 
4 time. 
5 (Jury out of the courtroom.) 
6 THE COURT: Mr. Yengich, the jury is now out of 
7 the courtroom. 
8 MR. YENGICH: Thank you. We renew our motion for 
9 mistrial and severance. The statement that was made 
10 by the witness that Travis got popped and the guy with 
11 hunting dogs at Willard Bay pointed out Travis as 
12 being one of the three or four guys at Willard Bay and 
13 then goes on to say that Travis even told on his 
14 cousin. That was his testimony. That's not how the 
15 actual letter reads. 
16 We have consistently and repeatedly 
17 objected to any statements that Travis made to anyone, 
18 be it to the defendant, to another individual or 
19 anyone. I'm advised as of today, once again, that Mr. 
20 Telford is not going to take the witness stand and 
21 testify. We can't confront any statements he made, 
22 even those statements that were made to the defendant, 
23 as to the truth or veracity of those statements. It 
24 goes to the direct reason why this matter has to be 
25 severed. We therefore move again for a mistrial. 
Brandon Dahlquist - X 
A. No, I did not. 
0 . So if he did testify to that, then, again, 
he's lying about that or mistaken? 
A. I imagine, yes. 
Q. And you're not? 
A. I'm no t . 
MR. BUNDERSON: (Pause.) I believe I'm done, 
Your Honor. If may have a moment? 
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
(Pause in the proceedings.) 
MR. BUNDERSON: That's all I have. 
THE COURT: Mr. Bouwhuis. 
MR. BOUWHUIS: Just one question. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. BOUWHUIS: 
Q. Brandon, there were questions from Mr. 
Yengich and Mr. Bunderson referring to documents in 
your cell at the prison? 
A. Yes. 
0. Those are not with you today? 
A. No, they're not. 
Q. You left them at the prison? 
A. Yes. 
MR. BOUWHUIS: That's all 
Defendant Telford's Closing ^rgaiaent 
MR. 30UWHIJIS : Thank you. ladies and gentlemen, 
7 ' m going to do something 7 haven't done for almost a 
this courtroom. That is, if 
The very first 
week «nd that's taiK in 
I'm kind of losing my voice 
can. 
trial that T did T wasn't able to finish because I had 
laryngitis. My client received a ticket for swearing 
o n the playground and I was in the sixth grade and we 
had a kind of play thing that T was an attorney in. 
Anyway, I wasn't able to finish that trial. I know 
we'll finish this one. 
I want to thank Jon Bunderson for taking 
most of my material. It's not often that Jon and I 
on the same side, to an extent. 
issues here that we do 
time because 
find ourselves 
Obviously there are some 
dispute. His argument will save us some 
t h e r e were some areas of overlap and I'm not going to 
spend as much time as I normally would have. I'll 
gloss o ver those areas more quickly. 
I want to get right to the point. Travis 
Travis Telford Telford didn't kill Troy Weston. 
didn't plan in the killing of Troy Weston. Travis 
Telf ord did not want or intend or 
olan in the killing 
of Troy We s ton. 
If you'll remember back last Tuesday we 
gave opening statements and talked about — I talked 
Defendant Telford'5 Closing Argument 
says if you feel good about \our decision, then it's a 
right decision and you've overcome reasonable doubt. 
I submit that if you're not able to exclude any 
4| reasonable explanation — any reasonable alternative 
5| explanation of the evidence, that you can't feel good 
6 1 about convicting my client if there's another 
7 reasonable explanation for the evidence that has been 
3 presented. We'll review that and I think we'll find 
9 that there is a reasonable alternative explanation. 
10 The State presented its evidence to 
11 support its theory. The question is how much was 
12 proven. Mr. Bunders on reviewed that. I'm just going 
13 to hit four basic points on what was proven. Troy 
14 Weston was beat up a week before he died. The reason 
15 is because he was ripping people off on drugs. He was 
16 selling drugs that were diluted so far down that 
17 people weren't happy with them. So he was beaten up. 
18 The following week, on the 12th of March, Travis and 
19 Brandon picked Troy up and took Troy out to Willard 
20 Bay. Brandon shot and killed him and they took the 
21 Blazer and had it repainted. Those are the highlights 
22 of what the State has proven. 
23 What hasn't the State proven? They 
24 haven't proven that Travis had motive to kill Troy 
25 Weston. They haven't proven that he planned to kill 
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that point or not bringing it up. 
Brandon Dahlquist, from the evidence, and 
3 1 Mr. Bunderson has argued this, shot Troy Weston. He's 
4 gone through the testimony of Jaim Carroll. I'm not 
5 going to go through all of that. However, Mr. 
6 Bunderson did not hit on a couple of things that I 
7 felt were important. 
8 A moment ago I indicated that the motive 
9 for the beating on March 5th was the bad drug sales. 
10 The motive for the killing on March 12th was not the 
11 same thing. Jaim Carroll testified that in the 
12 conversation he had with Brandon, Brandon indicated 
13 that he received a phone call and the contents of that 
14 phone call were that there was a $10,000 hit out on 
15 Troy. That Troy was a rat and was trying to set up a 
16 deal to get Brandon busted. That provides the motive 
17 for the killing. That motive has nothing to do with 
IS Travis Telford. 
19 MR. YENGICH: May we reserve our objection at 
20 this point? I don't want to interrupt counsel's 
21 argument, but we do have an objection and would 
22 reserve it to the conclusion of closing arguments. 
23 THE COURT: Yes. 
24 MR. YENGICH: Thank you. 
25 MR. BOUWHUIS: At any rate, that motive does not 
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Brandon starts to shoot. The evidence, from his 
admission to J a i m Carroll, is that lie in fact is the 
on& who shot him. 
Travis's statement to Detective Hansen 
concerning the shots are that Troy was shot in the 
shoulder, twice in the back. That he was hit in the 
spine, or Travis felt he'd been hit in the spine. Two 
more shots in the front and then the gun jammed. At 
that point Travis gets another clip and brings it 
back. Then there's — well, I'll get to that in a 
moment. 
The fact that Travis gets this clip and 
hands it to the shooter appears, without a closer 
analysis, appears to be aiding and causing in the 
death of Troy Weston. However, we know from the 
evidence that has come in that there have been threats 
made against Travis. His sister testified that she's 
had threats on her life and that Travis has had 
threats on his life. Jaim Carroll testified that 
Brandon said he wanted Travis dead. Detective Hansen 
testified that when Travis was arrested he didn't want 
to go to the Weber County jail. We have testimony 
that that's where Brandon Dahlquist was. 
Brandon Dahlquist threatened Jaim Carroll 
and said if you tell anybody I'm going to kill you. 
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had medical personnel on the scene, there was nothing 
they could have done. 
What was Travis's other involvement in 
this case? Mr. B u n d e r s o n has already indicated that 
the shells found in Travis's car didn't match the 
shells that killed Troy Weston. It was Winchester 
Super X shells and we've had testimony that that's a 
very common ammunition. 
The next thing we have to deal with is the 
fact that Travis admitted dragging the body over to 
the ditch. This sound morbid, but that does not - -
that did not contribute to the death of Troy. Ke was 
already dead at that point. 
I want to go back to the evidence I 
discussed concerning threats. It's very reasonable to 
infer from all the evidence that Travis was threatened 
and forced to do that. That's further supported by 
the point, by the fact, that Travis did that alone. 
He dragged the body alone while this young man stood 
there with the gun. 
Later that afternoon the Blazer is 
painted. I think it's very clear from the testimony 
that that was not done in an effort to cover up the 
murder. That had been planned before. In fact, they 
were going to paint it on Tuesday night, quite a bit 
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If he'd known about that he would have said I ' r. sick 
or I got something else to do. But he didn't have 
that choice or that knowledge. 
Something else we may cheese to fantasize 
about and that is that at the time the shooting 
occurred. I know all of you have watched television 
and have seen movies and we see heroes every night. 
You see people in a situation where 
pointing at a suspect and the hero jumps in and 
wrestles it ^way. They wrestle the 
take him off. Once in a while that may happen in real 
life, and police officers are trained to do that, but 
they don't always pull it off that well. 
I don't know what I would have done. I 
suspect you don't know exactly what you would have 
done at that moment. It's a completely unexpected 
thing that happened and there's no phone anywhere 
within a couple of m i l e s . No home for a mile and a 
half. I don't know what he could have done. He 
luldn't run to a phone. You've seen pictures of the 
He's out there and there's nothing nearby. 
I really don't think he could have jumped 
Brandon to get the gun away from him. We now have the 
luxury of looking at this in slow motion and can say 
what would we have done. This is a split second 
c oi 
s c e n e 
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decision that has to be made by somebody who is not 
trained to disarm somebody, is not trained in any of 
those kinds of procedures. 
I submit to you.. "Ladies and gentlemen, 
that there is a reasonable alternative explanation fo 
what happened. Therefore, there's a reasonable doubt 
The beating in this case, you heard, occurred for a 
different motive and was not extremely severe and 
there's no evidence that it happened before or since. 
The phone call about the hit on Troy and 
the fact that he was trying to set up a deal to bust 
Brandon had to do with Troy and there's no evidence 
that it had anything to do with Travis. There's no 
evidence that Troy — I'm sorry* There's no evidence 
that Travis knew it was going to happen cr that he 
planned it or wanted this to happen. 
I submit to you., ladies and gentlemen. I 
don't even think that Brandon planned this out. I 
think, after he got this phone call he probably knew 
at some point this would happen. But based on the 
facts we have here, this appears to be an impulsive o 
spontaneous killing. Here we are in the middle of a 
bright, clear, sunny day and we've got people all 
around. You heard that there were several people 
picnicking , fishing, working their dogs, driving up 
iSidebar discussion, not reported.) 
THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, we're going to 
allow you a brief recess while we make a matter of 
record. I suspect we'll also take a few minutes to 
stretch. I'm going to instruct the bailiff to escort 
you out in a minute. I want to remind you again to 
not discuss the case. The case is very close to being 
delivered to you for your determination and 
deliberations, but we're not there yet. Do not 
discuss the case while in the jury room. Don't 
discuss what has been said. Don't discuss it with 
each other. Don't show anyone your notes and don't 
allow anyone to discuss the matter with you. Please 
don't form an opinion as to the decisions you'll have 
to make until we are completed with all of the 
arguments . 
I'll ask the bailiff to escort you out for 
a few minutes while we make a record on a matter. 
(Jury out of the courtroom.) 
THE COURT: Go, ahead, Mr. Yengich. 
MR. YENGICH: Your Honor, at this time we move 
for a mistrial on behalf of defendant Dahlquist and 
also move for mistrial with jeopardy attaching. We 
believe that the error that was committed is invited 
error because of the improper joinder of the 
defendants under 7 7-3(a)-1 . carticularlv oaran little 
D and paren four, paren little A. All along in this 
case counsel for both defendants have argued that 
there are inconsistent defenses in this case which 
would lead to what I believe to be the improper, at 
this juncture, pointing of fingers at one another 
7 during the closing arguments. 
8 Mr. Bouwhuis has to do the best he can for 
9 his client and he's done that, but his entire closing 
10 argument, almost, was to point the finger at the 
11 defendant Dahlquist. His client decided not to take 
12 the stand and for that reason statements that were 
13 made about Mr. Dahlquist were not admitted into 
14 evidence. In arguing Mr. Bouwhuis put everything 
15 before the jury that the court redacted during the 
16 course of his closing argument. That's effectively 
17 what he did. Ke effectively put the rest of Telford's 
18 evidence against Mr. Dahlquist into the record. Mr. 
19 Bunderson couldn't, but he did. 
20 He referred on at least three occasions to 
21 what he thought happened on this occasion and what he 
22 thought about that Mr. Dahlquist had threatened Mr. 
23 Telford when that's not in evidence. That's not part 
24 of the evidence. It's not part of the evidence that 
25 the court allowed. 
He indicated he didn't think that certain 
people were lying. He indicated what wasn't brought 
forward by the defendant Dahlquist. The fact that the 
defendant Telford didn't want to go to the Weber 
County jail because he was afraid the defendant 
Dahlquist. There's no evidence of that whatsoever. 
That is pure speculation on behalf of Mr. Bouwhuis. I 
say this with respect to him and I understand what his 
attempt is in this case amd it is exactly why these 
cases should have been severed from the outset. 
"When two or more defendants are jointly 
charged with an offense they should be tried jointly 
unless the court, in its discretion, on motion or 
otherwise, orders separate trials consistent with the 
interests of justice." I'm reading from 7 7 - 8 (a) -1 . 
4A says that "If the court finds a defendant or the 
prosecution is prejudiced by a joinder of offenses or 
or defendants in an indictment or information or by a 
joinder for trial together, the court shall order an 
election of separate trials of separate counts, grant 
a severance of defendants, or provide other relief as 
justice requires." 
That's the case here. Mr. Bouwhuis, the 
only way he believes he can his client off, is to 
stand up and point the finger at Brandon Dahlquist and 
in doing ^ o hasn't even put his own client on the 
btand to V b r i f y . H<= says it's reasonable to a s s u n
 c 
that the gunman stood over the body ctnd then forced 
Travis to move the body and forced Travis to go get 
the shells. There is no evidence in the record of any 
of that. I won't go into everything he said in that 
regard. 
He then goes on and says I don't think 
Brandon planned it. What his thoughts arc, once 
again, is something Mr. Bunderson himself couldn't do, 
but co-defendant's counsel has done in this very case. 
That is exactly why this case should have been severed 
when it was originally argued and why it should have 
been Severed the second time it was argued before 
trial. During the course of trial we have made three 
motions for mistrial and for severance for this very 
reason. 
What does Mr. Snider now get to do? He 
gets to stand up and can't argue anything about Mr. 
Telford because Mr. Telford did not subject himself to 
the witness stand like Mr. Dahlquist did. For that 
reason we move for a mistrial and claim that that 
invited error. It is invited error because the State 
of Utah in this case, the county attorney's office, 
determined that these two men should be tried together 
as opposed to being tried separate!/ which they 
should have from the outset. With due respect to what 
Mr. Bouwhuis did in his closing arguments, he argued 
things that Mr. Bunderscn just simply couldn't. We 
had to sit there and take it. It's like there are two 
prosecutors in the case. That's exactly why severance 
is mandated in this particular case. 
One other comment. We also believe, c v e n 
though that is a proper motion and it's a motion that 
the court should grant, what we ask Is that this case 
against II r. Dahlquist be mistried and jeopardy has 
happened and that the information against him be 
dismissed for that reason. It is invited error. 
Secondly, if the court denies that notion, 
we ask that Mr. Snider be able to comment on the fact 
that the defendant Telford did not take the stand and 
subject himself to the same type of scrutiny and 
cross-examination that the defendant Dahlquist did. 
Effectively, that is what Mr. Bouwhuis has invited us 
to do in this particular case. 
THE COURT: Mr. Bunderson. 
MR. BUNDERSON: There's really two issues here. 
Mr. Yengich has argued that everything that was 
redacted from the Telford statements came in through 
Mr. Bouwhuis's argument. I submit that that's really 
not true. Everything that was redacted from the 
Telford statements came in through the evidence 
presented in this case and through Mr. Dahlquist13 own 
admissions to J a i m Carroll. Or through his admission, 
excuse me, to Dale Ward. And through evidence, 
independent evidence, presented by other witnesses. 
Again, that gets us right back to where we 
started, that the statements need to be redacted at a 
joint trial but everything else comes in against both 
defendants. That's all that has happened. 
Secondly, as to any allegedly improper 
statement made by Mr. Bouwhuis during his closing 
argument, that's already been dealt with. It has been 
told to the jury that they are not to consider any 
statements of counsel as evidence. In fact, the 
instruction, I believe, was given at the beginning of 
the trial and is part of the court's instructions. It 
was given at the request of defendant Dahlquist in 
even stronger terms just a few moments ago when the 
court told the jury, basically, that Mr. Bouwhuis was 
out of line in giving his opinion about things. The 
cautionary instruction, I submit, resolved that issue. 
There is no invited error. 
Again, Mr. Yengich, as always, makes an 
artful argument, but the doctrine of invited error, I 
submit, doesn't apply in this particular case. 
Nothing has changed fro;,i the very beginning. All this 
is is the sort of thing that is anticipated in a joint 
trial. It's the sort of thing that has been argued 
and it's the sort of thing that the Neld case and 
March vs. Richardson both anticipate. There's nothing 
improper about it. 
THE COURT: Mr. nouwhuis. 
MR . 30UWKUI3: J< e 11 . Your Honor, I'm stuck 
between a rock and a hard place here. On the one 
hand, being a young, inexperienced attorney, and I 
know Mr. Ycngich is doing his job and I know he 
doesn't mean any offense, but I still feel the need to 
defend myself. At the same time, I have to be honest 
with the court. I apologize for giving my personal 
opinions. I didn't intend to do that. I didn't 
intend to do it to prejudice anybody or harm anybody. 
I have to be honest. If the court were to 
grant a m i s t r i a l , that would be great. I didn't have 
that in mind when I did that and I certainly -- I'm 
not sure I had the knowledge that those remarks would 
have brought that on. I'm not sure what my position 
is supposed to be, except that on the second — Mr. 
Yengich is asking for a mistrial and if that's not 
granted he's asking Mr. Snider be allowed to comment 
on Travis's failure to take the stand. I do have a 
position on that. I'm not sure I h a ; c to arcuc that 
My comments on the evidence would go along 
with what Mr. Bunderson said. The things that I 
argued was grom the evidence that was presented. I 
didn't argue -- I was very careful. T did look at 
this redacted statement, but T was very careful not to 
say what Travis said that Brandon said. That's an 
obvious problem we have in trying this trial together. 
Brandon said some things to Jaim Carroll. I don't 
know how I can legitimately ignore that and pretend 
that evidence isn't there. Obviously Travis was there 
with somebody. I never said Travis said Brandon did 
this and that. I was careful in my wording to say 
when the shots were fired; and I even said the 
shooter, I didn't say Brandon. 
But as counsel has indicated, there's 
absolutely no way to separate these out. They should 
have been severed in the first place. That's the 
problem I had in coming to closing and arguing the 
evidence. It's not real clear what I can and can't 
argue, except I do know that I can't say Travis said 
Brandon did this and Travis said Brandon did that. So 
I was careful not to say that. Everything that I 
drgued. excluding the improper remarks about m v 
personal opinions u n certain things., everything else I 
argued came in through proper channels. Su I would 
ask the court not to — I don't think we have opened 
the door to have his Fifth Amendment right commented 
on. He's not waived that. 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Yengich gets the last 
word on this. 
MR. YENGICH: If Mr. Bunderson wants to comment 
on what he said, I will take the last word. 
MR. BUNDER SON: Very briefly. I forgot to mention 
that we do not agree that Dahlquist should now be 
allowed to comment on Telford's lack of testimony. I 
think that would — if the defendant were allowed that 
we'd have a far bigger problem than any imagined 
problem that we have now. Thank you. 
MR. YENGICH: What I said was that what 
effectively he did was, and I hope I said effectively, 
was to get the unredacted portions in. Richardson, 
again, and you've heard the language from Richardson 
time and time again, does not allow even the mere 
reference to the existence of a co-defendant. 
Mr. Bonwhuis refers to Brandon Dahlquist 
being the shooter, effectively, throughout the course 
of his closing argument. In effect there's two 
prosecutors here and that is the problem. That's why 
2i this case should have been severed. That's why I 
3 claim, on behalf of Mr. Dahlquist, it was invited 
4 e rror . 
5 I want to niake something clear about Mr. 
•6 Bouwhuis. I don't think he's an inexperienced lawyer 
7 at all- I think he gave a very effective closing 
' 8 J argument on behalf of his client. I don't think he 
9 did anything intentionally and unethically at all. 
10 He's doing the best he can to represent his client 
11 under the circumstances, but the circumstances are 
12 brought on by the fact that Mr. Bunderson, on behalf 
13 of the State of Utah, has consistently refused the 
14 option of severance in this particular case and he put 
15 Mr. Bouwhuis in the position which he found himself. 
16 That's our objection. 
17 It also puts us in a position of not being 
18 able to effectively confront what really is the 
19 opinion as to the case scenario from Mike Bouwhuis. 
20 That's all it is. It's his opinion as to what 
21 happened in this case. I never got an opportunity to 
22 cross-examine it. Neither did Mr. Snider. Yet that's 
23 what we're left with in front of the jury because 
24 these two cases are joined. 
25 THE COURT: I'm going to rule as follows. I will 
